D. WARREN JUSTICE.
the court is plaintiffs' motion to determine the date at
which post-judgment interest began to accrue.
March 5, 2018 the court entered a judgment against defendants
bused on the jury verdict but expressly noted that it was not
a final judgment because judgment had not entered on
defendants' equitable counterclaim for disassociation. In
that judgment the court also specified that
"post-judgment interest shall run from the entry of
final judgment at 7.76%."
March 15, 2013 the court entered judgment for plaintiff
Tucker Cianchette dismissing defendants' counterclaim for
disassociation, stating, "This represents final judgment
on all the claims in this case."
March 19, 2018 defendants filed a motion for judgment as a
matter of law on certain of plaintiffs' claims pursuant
to M.R.Civ.P. 50(b) and for a new trial as to all claims
pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 59(a). That motion was denied in an
order tiled on June 12, 2018, and defendants thereafter
4, 2019 the Law Court affirmed the judgment. Cianchette
v. Cianchette, 2019 ME 87.
3, 2019 defendants paid the judgment amounts with interest
calculated on the basis that prejudgment interest stopped and
post-judgment interest began on June 12, 2018 - the date that
the court denied defendants' post-judgment motion.
contend instead that post-judgment interest began to run on
March 5 or March 15, 2018, Because of the size of the
judgment in this case, the difference in whether
post-judgment interest started in March or in June is not
outset, defendants argue that since final judgment was
entered more than a year ago, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of when post-judgment
interest begins to run.
is authority for the proposition that the court has
continuing jurisdiction to resolve issues relating to the
interpretation of its judgments. E.g., Chamberlain v.
Harriman, 2017 ME 127 ¶ 13, 165 A.3d 351, Although
that has generally been limited to allowing clarification
when judgments are ambiguous, the March 5 judgment specified
that post-judgment interest "shall run from the entry of
final judgment," and the parties are now disputing the
meaning of that term. As a result, this case fits within the
court's continuing jurisdiction to resolve ambiguities in
the absence of ambiguity, continuing jurisdiction would exist
to rule on disputes about pre- and post-judgment interest
arising after an appeal. If the court were to decline to hear
the pending motion, plaintiffs could then seek a writ of
execution including the post-judgment interest that they
contend has not been paid. The existing dispute would then have to
be resolved by the court in determining the commencement of
post-judgment interest for purposes of the writ of execution.
of Post-Judgment Interest
the applicable statute, "post-judgment interest accrues
from and after the date of entry of judgment and includes the
period of any appeal." 14 M.R.S. § 1602-C(2).
Defendants essentially argue that even though judgment was
entered in March, the court should ignore the statutory
language and rule that post-judgment interest only accrues
from the denial of defendants' post-judgment motion in
June. The court rejects that view for the reasons sets forth
in the First Circuit's decision in Marsh ...