Submitted On Briefs: June 26, 2019
Plourde, appellant pro se
Melissa L. Martin, Esq., Pine Tree Legal Assistance,
Portland, for appellee Jane Doe
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and
HUMPHREY, J. 
Glen Plourde appeals from a protection from harassment order
entered against him in the District Court (Waterville,
R.A. French, J.) on the complaint of Jane Doe.
See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4653, 4655(1) (2018).
Plourde argues that the court abused its discretion in
consolidating the hearing on his motion to dissolve the
temporary protection from harassment order and the final
hearing on Doe's complaint, and in issuing a scheduling
order that limited the time for the consolidated hearing to
two hours. He also argues that the court erred in finding
credible the testimony of two witnesses and in finding that
he intentionally sought to harass Doe. We affirm the
In May 2018, Doe first noticed Plourde watching her as she
left her home. He made kissing movements and moved his head
and body to follow her as she drove by him three times that
day. Doe then noticed Plourde smoking while he observed and
walked by her home multiple times each day from May to
August. This caused her to be fearful, feel uncomfortable,
and change her daily routine to avoid being outdoors. Plourde
later requested copies of the blueprints to her home from the
town office. Plourde was arrested after entering Doe's
driveway and observing her through the glass portion of her
On August 30, 2018, Doe filed a complaint for protection from
harassment against Plourde in the Waterville District Court.
5 M.R.S. § 4653(1) (2018). The court [Mathews,
J.) issued a temporary protection from harassment order
that same day. Id. §4654(2) (2018). On
September 18, 2018, Plourde filed a motion to dissolve, which
was scheduled for a hearing on September 27, 2018.
Id. § 4654(6) (2018). Because Doe was not
served with the motion to dissolve until the night before the
hearing, the court [Davis, J.) continued the hearing
to October 1, 2018, consolidating it with the final hearing
on Doe's complaint. On October 1, the court
[Stanfill, J.) continued the hearing on both motions
due to the court's schedule. Between October 12 and 23,
2018, Plourde served witness subpoenas on numerous
individuals and filed many letters with the court. After
reviewing Plourde's materials, the court issued a
scheduling order limiting the time allotted for the
consolidated hearing to two hours-each party was
"limited to one hour for both cross-examination and
direct presentation of his or her case."
On October 31, 2018, the court [R.A. French, J.)
held the consolidated hearing and issued a one-year
protection from harassment order on the basis that Doe
"established stalking" and "established three
or more acts of intimidation that caused her fear and, in
fact, were done with the intent to intimidate." Plourde
timely appealed without filing a motion for further findings.
M.R. App. P. 2B(c); M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).
Plourde first challenges the court's decision to
consolidate the final hearing on Doe's complaint and the
hearing on his motion to dissolve the temporary protection
from harassment order. We review the court's procedural
decision to consolidate the hearings for an abuse of
discretion. See M.R. Civ. P. 42(a); Maietta v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 496 A.2d 286, 290-91 (Me.
Contrary to Plourde's argument, the court did not abuse
its discretion in consolidating the hearings. First, the
court did not improperly continue the hearing on
Plourde's motion to dissolve, which had been scheduled to
be heard on September 27, 2018, after Doe was served only the
night before. See 5 M.R.S. § 4654(6). Second,
pursuant to section 4654(6), the court has discretion with
regard to when to hold the hearing on the motion to dissolve.
See id. In this case, the court quickly rescheduled
the hearing to two business days later-October 1, 2018-when
the parties were already scheduled to appear in court for the
final hearing on Doe's complaint. It is within the
court's discretion to consolidate hearings where, as
here, there is a common question of law or fact. M.R. Civ. P.
42(a). In this case, the hearings involved common questions
of law and fact, namely, whether Doe could demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Plourde harassed her. 5
M.R.S. § 4654(1), (6) (2018). Finally, the court's
decision to consolidate the hearings did not disadvantage
Plourde. At both a hearing on a motion to dissolve
and a final hearing on a complaint for protection from
harassment, it is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate
to the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
protection order is appropriate. Id. The court's
decision to consolidate the hearings did not relieve Doe of
her burden or otherwise disadvantage or prejudice Plourde.
Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion.
See M.R. Civ. P. 42(a);Maietta, 496 A.2d at
Plourde next challenges the court's [Stanfill,
J.) scheduling order limiting the consolidated hearing
to two hours, allotting one hour to each party to
cross-examine and present its case. We review a trial
court's scheduling order for an abuse of discretion. M.R.
Civ. P. l6A(a). Contrary to Plourde's argument, the court
did not abuse its discretion in issuing a scheduling order
limiting the duration of the consolidated hearing and the
issues to be considered. See id. Pursuant to Rule
l6A(a), "the court may issue a scheduling order, trial
management order, or other order directing the future course
of the action." Id. Moreover, the "trial
court has broad discretion to control the order and timing of
presentation of evidence and to set and enforce reasonable
time limits on testimonial hearings." Dolliverv.
Dolliver,2001 ME 144, ¶ 10, 782 A.2d 316. Based on
prior court-related experiences with Plourde, the number of
subpoenas Plourde filed (few, if any, of which were likely to
generate relevant evidence), and the relative simplicity of
the issues to be decided at the hearing, the court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting the total time for the
hearing to two hours, nor in explicitly restricting the scope
of inquiry to issues relevant to the protection from
harassment order. See M.R. Civ. P. ...