IGNACIO D. ROQUE
STATE OF MAINE
Argued: May 15, 2019
Lawrence C. Winger, Esq. (orally), Portland, for appellant
Ignacio D. Roque
M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst.
Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta,
for appellee State of Maine
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
Ignacio D. Roque appeals from a judgment of the Superior
Court (Cumberland County, Eggert, J.) dismissing his
petition for post-conviction review as untimely filed. Roque
contends that the court erred when it dismissed his petition
because he had not been informed of the filing deadline
contained in 15 M.R.S. § 2128-B (2018), and therefore
the court was precluded from summarily dismissing the
petition based on the statutory filing deadline. We disagree
and affirm the dismissal of Roque's petition.
On September 23, 2016, Roque pleaded guilty to charges of
aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A
M.R.S. § 1105-A (2015),  and illegal importation of
scheduled drugs (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 1118 (2018).
The record does not reflect that Roque was informed by the
court or his attorney of his right to file a petition for
post-conviction review or of any of the associated filing
deadlines. Roque did not directly appeal his conviction but
filed a petition for post-conviction review on January 10,
2018, seeking to collaterally attack his conviction on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After counsel was
appointed to represent Roque, the State responded to
Roque's petition, seeking dismissal on the ground that
the petition was untimely filed.
On September 18, 2018, the court granted the State's
request and dismissed Roque's petition as untimely filed.
See 15 M.R.S. §2128-B(1). Roque timely
appealed the court's dismissal and we granted Roque a
certificate of probable cause to proceed with the appeal.
See 15 M.R.S. § 2131(1) (2018); M.R.App. P.
The question presented in this case is whether a
defendant's trial attorney or a sentencing court has any
obligation to notify a defendant of his or her rights
pursuant to the post-conviction review statute, 15 M.R.S.
§§ 2121-2132 (2018). Roque contends that the court
erred in its determination that there is no duty imposed on
trial counsel or the sentencing court to inform a defendant
about the deadlines for filing a post-conviction review
petition. We review a post-conviction court's legal
conclusions de novo. Fortune v. State, 2017 ME 61,
¶ 12, 158 A.3d 512.
Roque asserts that the sentencing court's duty to advise
defendants of the deadline for filing a petition for
post-conviction review during a Rule 11 guilty plea stems
from a "due process precondition." Although Rule 11
imposes numerous duties on the court, specifically informing
a defendant about post-conviction review is not one of them.
M.R.U. Crim. P. ll(b)(1)-(4). Furthermore, Roque does not
cite, and our independent research fails to reveal, any
authority supporting the proposition that a sentencing court
has an affirmative duty to advise defendants about their
rights to seek post-conviction review. We ...