Argued: May 15, 2019
L. Cummings, Esq., (orally), Norman Hanson DeTroy, Portland,
and Jeffrey P. White, pro se, for appellant Jeffrey P. White
P. Kelley, Esq. (orally), Board of Overseers of the Bar,
Augusta, for appellee Board of Overseers of the Bar
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY,
On April 26, 2018, the Board of Overseers of the Bar
instituted disciplinary proceedings against attorney Jeffrey
P. White by filing a four-count information with the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, alleging that White violated more
than a dozen provisions of the Maine Rules of Professional
Conduct. See M. Bar R. 13(e)(7)(D), (10)(E), (g).
After a testimonial hearing, the single justice
[Alexander, J.) found and concluded that White
violated multiple ethical rules as to each of the four
counts, for which the single justice sanctioned White to a
nine-month license suspension and a public reprimand.
See M.R. Prof. Conduct 1.3, 1.4(a)(2)-(4), 1.5(i),
1.15(b), 1.16(d), 3.3(a), 3.4(b), 4.1(a), 5.3, 8.4(c). White
appeals, advancing arguments regarding procedural due
process, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting some of the court's findings, and arguing that
the sanction was overly harsh.
Contrary to White's contentions, we discern no due
process violations in the court's consideration of
ethical rules that were not pleaded in the Board's
information, see Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v.
Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶¶ 14-15, 707 A.2d 69;
Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Rodway, 461 A.2d
1062, 1064 (Me. 1983), or in the court's application of
the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof,
see M. Bar R. 14(b)(4); In re Barach, 540
F.3d 82, 85-86 (1st Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Although White correctly asserts that the court made several
factual errors in its decision, including by relying on
evidence that was not admitted and making findings that have
no record support,  see Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24, ¶
11, 707 A.2d 69, we conclude that the factual errors, even
when viewed together, do not undermine the reasonableness of
the sanction the court imposed as to those findings that are
supported by the record. See M.R. Civ. P. 61; M. Bar
R. 21; State v. Sanchez, 2014 ME 50, ¶ 13 n.3,
89 A.3d 1084; In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114,
¶¶ 24-25, 775 A.2d 1144; MP Assocs. v.
Liberty, 2001 ME 22, ¶ 29, 771 A.2d 1040.
Finally, although the court did not explicitly articulate its
consideration of the American Bar Association's Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Am. Bar Ass'n 1992) (ABA
Sanction Standards) in fashioning the sanction, because the
sanction imposed nevertheless comports with the ABA Sanction
Standards, we do not disturb the court's decision on this
basis  See MR Civ P 61; In re Scott
S, 2001 ME 114, ¶¶ 24-25, 775 A.2d 1144; ABA
Sanction Standards 442, 61, 612-614, 92, 921, 922(a); see
also M Bar R 21(c); Bd of Overseers of the Bar v
Prolman, 2018 ME 128, ¶ 29, 193 A.3d 808 (Jabar, J,
concurring). The sanction of a suspension from practice for
less than a year was neither overly harsh nor outside of the
court's broad discretion.
 There was some discussion about
Exhibit 7 during the oral argument in this appeal. On review,
we conclude that Exhibit 7 was not admitted at trial, and