United States District Court, D. Maine
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
K. Johnstone United States Magistrate Judge
Samuel Hooker has filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. No.
43) (“FAC”) and Second Amended Complaint (Doc.
No. 49) (“SAC”). The court construes each filing
as a proposed addendum to Hooker's initial complaint
(Doc. No. 1). The FAC and SAC are before this court for
preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
is a paraplegic prisoner confined to a wheelchair. In this
case, Hooker has asserted that on four occasions in August
and September 2012, U.S. Marshals Service
(“USMS”) employees Dean Knightly, Jesse Belanger,
Spencer Christie, Clairmont Forde, and two unnamed
individuals, transported him to court from the Cumberland
County Jail in a non-handicapped van. Hooker had requested to
be transported in a wheelchair accessible vehicle, but his
request was denied because the defendants did not have access
to such a van. Because the van was not wheelchair accessible,
those individuals transported Hooker by placing him on the
floor in the back of the van, next to his wheelchair, without
securing him in the van with a seatbelt or other safety
restraints, despite Hooker's request to be so secured. As
a result of this mode of transport, and the alleged traffic
violations and reckless driving of the transporting officers,
Hooker asserts, he was injured during those van rides.
initial Complaint (Doc. No. 1), Hooker asserted claims under
the FTCA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). The Bivens and Rehabilitation Act
claims have been dismissed, and the defendants to those
claims have been dropped from this action. See July
17, 2018 Order (Doc. No. 41) (approving Apr. 23, 2018 R&R
(Doc. No. 29)). The FTCA claims were served on the United
States, see Apr. 23, 2018 Order (Doc. No. 30), and
remain pending at this time. Hooker now seeks to add claims
that the defendants' actions violated his rights under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
constituted crimes and state traffic law violations.
attempts to assert ADA claims against Knightly, Belanger,
Christie, Forde, and two unnamed employees of the USMS in
both their individual and official capacities. Title II of
the ADA provides a right of action where “‘a
“‘public entity' [has discriminated] against
a ‘qualified individual with a disability' on
account of that individual's disability.” Pa.
Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see also Parker v.
Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000).
is no individual liability under Title II of the ADA.”
Gross v. Landry, No. 1:17-cv-00297-JAW, 2017 WL
5509995, at *5 (D. Me. Nov. 17, 2017). To the extent Hooker
seeks to assert ADA claims against the named defendants in
their individual capacities, the district judge should
dismiss the claims.
extent Hooker seeks to assert ADA claims against the named
defendants in their official capacities, such claims are not
viable. Neither the United States nor its agencies, including
the USMS, fall within the statute's definition of
“public entity.” See 42 U.S.C. §
12131; Manuel v. City of Bangor, No. 09-CV-339-B-W,
2009 WL 3672917, *4 (D. Me. Oct. 30, 2009), R&R
approved, 691 F.Supp.2d 212 (D. Me. 2010). Accordingly,
the district judge should dismiss each of Hooker's
proposed ADA claims.
asserts that defendants are liable to him in this action
because their conduct in placing him in the back of the van
without a seatbelt was criminal, as it violated Maine traffic
laws which require the use of seatbelts. “Private
citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” In re
Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig.,
456 F.Supp.2d 131, 145 (D. Me. 2006) (quoting Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because Hooker
cannot state a private cause of action based on the named
defendants' alleged violation of state criminal laws and
traffic laws, the district judge should dismiss those claims.
fully explained herein, the district judge should dismiss
Hooker's proposed complaint addenda (Doc. Nos. 43, 49),
as they fail to state any claim upon which relief might be
granted. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation
must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period
may be extended upon motion. Failure to file specific written
objections to the Report and Recommendation within the