SYDNEY A. TERMORSHUIZEN et al.
SPURWINK SERVICES, INC.
Argued: February 6, 2019
Loranger, Esq. (orally), and Danielle Quinlan, Esq., Law
Office of Guy D. Loranger, Old Orchard Beach, for appellants
Sydney A. TerMorshuizen and Patricia A. TerMorshuizen
Graydon G. Stevens, Esq. (orally), Kelly, Remmel &
Zimmerman, Portland, for appellee Spurwink Services, Inc.
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
Sydney A. TerMorshuizen and Patricia A. TerMorshuizen appeal
from a summary judgment entered by the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Horton, J.) in favor of Spurwink
Services, Inc. (Spurwink) on the TerMorshuizens' claim
for overtime pay pursuant to 26 M.R.S. § 664 (2018). In
this appeal we consider whether interruptions to "sleep
time" are compensable under section 664. The
TerMorshuizens contend that the court erred in considering
analogous federal law and in concluding that Spurwink's
sleep time policy was reasonable as a matter of law. We
affirm the court's judgment.
The following facts are drawn from the parties'
statements of material facts and their stipulated exhibits.
See Sullivan v. St. Joseph's Rehab. &
Residence, 2016 ME 107, ¶ 2, 143 A.3d 1283.
Spurwink is a licensed, nonprofit mental health agency that
provides treatment, education, and rehabilitation services to
individuals with emotional, behavioral, mental, or
intellectual disabilities. The TerMorshuizens were employed
by Spurwink and worked as a therapeutic couple at a
residential facility in Spurwink's Chelsea program-a day
and residential treatment program for children and
adolescents with significant emotional and behavioral needs.
They worked in this capacity from September 6, 2011, to
December 14, 2016.
As a therapeutic couple, the TerMorshuizens were responsible
for "maintaining a home-like, caring, clean and safe
environment, contributing to the continuity of programming
within the residential setting, and recognizing and
implementing the recommendations put forth by the
client's ... treatment plans," and administering
prescribed medications. (Quotation marks omitted.) Throughout
their tenure, the TerMorshuizens cared for a total of eight
children-seven females and one male, ranging in age from nine
to eighteen- and typically cared for three children at a
time. The children had all suffered some type of
abuse-physical, sexual, emotional, or some combination
thereof-and required near constant supervision during waking
Like other therapeutic couples, the TerMorshuizens lived in
the residence with the children. They worked a rotating
two-week schedule whereby they were in the home for ten
consecutive days and eleven consecutive nights and then had
four days off. At the start of their employment, the
TerMorshuizens were paid for all hours of the ten-day shift
except for up to eight hours of sleep time each night and a
daily break of three to four hours for eight days of the
shift. On July 6, 2012, they signed a new Employee Status
Report (ESR) that altered this ten-day shift schedule
slightly to provide for seven hours of nightly sleep time and
eight daily four-hour breaks.
Also included in the ESR was a reference to Spurwink's
written policy providing for compensation for sleep time
interruptions that call a therapeutic couple to duty to
attend to a client. If the interruption prevents the
employee from getting five hours of sleep-not necessarily
five consecutive hours-the employee is entitled to be paid
for all scheduled sleep time hours. This policy was reflected
in the TerMorshuizens' ESR. The TerMorshuizens recorded
their work hours on timesheets and were responsible for
including on the timesheets any sleep time interruptions that
required them to directly care for the children.
On May 4, 2017, the TerMorshuizens brought suit against
Spurwink for unpaid wages. They alleged that they are
entitled to overtime wages, pursuant to 26 M.R.S.
§§ 664, 670, for all time worked in excess of forty
hours per week. They argued that, while Spurwink paid them
for all time recorded on their timesheets, including recorded
sleep time interruptions, they are entitled to payment for
other client interruptions that prevented them from sleeping,
which Spurwink had not allowed them to include on their
On March 23, 2018, Spurwink moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that its sleep time compensation policy was in
compliance with federal law, specifically 29 C.F.R. §
785.23 (2018), and was reasonable as a matter of law. On June
26, 2018, the court (Cumberland County, Horton, J.)
granted Spurwink's motion on each ground. The
TerMorshuizens timely appealed the court's decision.
See M.R. App. P. 2B(c).
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the
nonprevailing party to determine whether the parties'
statements of material facts and the record evidence to which
the statements refer demonstrate that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Rainey v. Langen,2010 ME 56, ¶ 23, 998 A.2d 342 (quoting Beal v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,2010 ME 20, ¶ 11, 989 A.2d 733);
see also Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp.,2015 ME 63,
¶ 19, 116 A.3d 466 ("When the material facts are