United States District Court, D. Maine
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Z. SINGAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 24). For reasons
briefly explained herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and a demand for the relief
sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)-(3). A viable complaint
need not proffer “heightened fact pleading of
specifics, ” but in order to survive a motion to
dismiss it must contain “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In
evaluating whether a complaint states a plausible claim, we
‘perform [a] two-step analysis.'”
Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cardigan Mtn. School v.
N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d. 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015)). First,
“the court must separate the complaint's factual
allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its
conclusory legal allegations (which need not be
credited).” Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of Puerto
Rico, 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012). Second, the
court “must determine whether ‘the factual
content … allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.'” Id. at 224 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the truth of the facts
contained in the pleadings and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Schatz v.
Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st
Cir. 2012). In assessing whether a complaint adequately
states a claim, the Court considers the “facts and
documents that are part of or incorporated into the
complaint.” United Auto., Aerospace, Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. Int'l Union v.
Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011)
(quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a pro se pleading,
a somewhat “less stringent” standard applies and
the Court may consider other filings by the pro se litigant
in order to “understand the nature and basis of his
claims.” Wall v. Dion, 257 F.Supp.2d 316, 318
(D. Me. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Ruth Soong (“Soong”), worked for Defendant Bath
Iron Works (“BIW”) for nearly eleven years. Soong
was hired as a designer on January 8, 2007. She voluntarily
resigned her position at BIW and took early retirement
effective November 14, 2017.
some period of time in 2017 prior to her resignation, Soong
was on FMLA leave related to anxiety. She returned to work
from this leave on August 2, 2017. She received “a
warning for not finishing work on schedule” on August
10, 2017. (Am. Compl. ¶ 193.) Thereafter, she received
“a good evaluation” on August 14, 2017. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 194.) On November 7, 2017, Soong came to
believe “her termination was imminent” based on
feedback she received from two BIW employees, Michelle Riley
and Nick Carter. (Am. Compl. ¶ 80.) Thus, she made the
decision to retire and avoid the risk “of losing all
her entitlement for pension and retirement benefits”
that could occur if she was terminated. (Am. Compl. ¶
83.) Soong's last day of work was November 14, 2017. She
asserts that she was “not accorded a standard
conventional retirement” and was denied the opportunity
to pack up her personal belongings upon her departure. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 84-99.)
April 18, 2018, Soong filed a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC. She subsequently received a right-to-sue letter on
May 10, 2018. This complaint was in fact the second time
Soong had made a charge of discrimination against BIW before
the EEOC. Soong first filed with the EEOC on July 27, 2015,
while still actively employed by BIW. This first EEOC
complaint was dismissed on August 15, 2016. (See
Exs. A & B (ECF Nos. 24-1 & 24-2).)
filed the present action pro se on August 3, 2018.
Court reads Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19) as
stating the following federal claims: (1) violation of the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), (2) Disability
Discrimination in violation of Title VII & Section 1981,
(3) Age Discrimination in violation of Title VII &
Section 1981, (4) Race Discrimination in Violation of Title
VII & Section 1981, and (5) Retaliation in violation of
Title VII & Section 1981. Plaintiff also appears to plead
related state claims, including Conspiracy, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Breach of Implied
Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing.
Plaintiff ‘s Time-Barred Federal Claims
“Title VII requires, as a predicate to a civil action,
that the complainant first file an administrative charge with
the EEOC within a specified and relatively short time period
(usually 180 or 300 days) after the discrimination complained
of, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), and that the lawsuit be
brought within an even shorter period (90 days) after notice
that the administrative charge is dismissed or after the
agency instead issues a right-to-sue letter . . . .”
Clockedile v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corr., 245
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2001). Here, the federal statutes invoked
by Plaintiff in support of her claims for discrimination and
retaliation required her to file her administrative claim
within 300 days. See, e.g., Burnett v. Ocean