Submitted On Briefs: February 20, 2019
Wayne
Doane, Esq., Exeter, for appellant Father
Janet
T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee
Department of Health and Human Services
Panel:
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
PER
CURIAM
[¶1]
Christopher S. appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Skowhegan, Benson, J.) terminating his parental
rights to two of his children[1]pursuantto 22 M.R.S. §
4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2018).[2] He challenges the
court's determination that termination of his parental
rights provides the children with "permanency" and
is in the children's best interests. See 22
M.R.S. § 4O55(1)(B)(2)(a). We affirm the judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
[¶2]
The following facts, which are supported by competent record
evidence, are drawn from the court's findings and the
procedural record. See In re Children of Corey W.,
2019 ME 4, ¶ 2, __A.3d__.
[¶3]
On December 4, 2017, the Department of Health and Human
Services filed a petition for a child protection order and
preliminary protection order, requesting that the court place
the children in the sole custody of the mother.[3] See 22
M.R.S. §§4032, 4034(1) (2018). The petition alleged
that between April of 2009 and January of 2016 the Department
received many reports of concerns that the father had been
physically and emotionally abusive and that the parents were
not meeting the children's medical, educational, dental,
and mental health needs. The court (Benson, J.)
issued a preliminary protection order and placed the children
in the custody of the mother.
[¶4]
In January of 2018, the court entered an agreed jeopardy
order against the father based on "serious abuse and
neglect [of the children], as evidenced by the threat of
serious harm posed by the father's unmanaged mental
health problems and domestic violence, as well as his
deprivation of adequate food, clothing, shelter, supervision,
care, and education." See 22 M.R.S. § 4035
(2018). Although the court also found jeopardy as to the
mother based on past concerns about her parenting
capabilities and the risks posed by the father, the court
ordered that the children remain in her custody. The jeopardy
order required the father to participate in a court-ordered
diagnostic evaluation, [4] dialectical behavior therapy, and
medication management.
[¶5]
Several months later, the father moved for the court to order
the mother to allow him to have contact with the children.
After a contested hearing, the court denied the motion, and
shortly thereafter the Department petitioned for termination
of his parental rights. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052
(2018). In August of 2018, the court held a hearing on the
petition, where the mother, two departmental caseworkers, and
the paternal grandmother testified. The father chose not to
testify. The court subsequently entered a judgment
terminating the father's parental rights. In the
judgment, the court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the father was unwilling or unable to protect the
children from jeopardy and was unwilling or unable to take
responsibility for the children, and that these circumstances
were unlikely to change within a time that is reasonably
calculated to meet the children's needs; and that he had
failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and
reunify with the children. See 22 M.R.S. §
4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv). The court also determined
that termination of the father's parental rights is in
the children's best interests. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).
[¶6]
The court made the following factual findings, all of which
are supported by competent record evidence. See In re
Child of Jonathan D., 2019 ME 14, ¶ 5, __A.3d__.
Between this case and a prior one, the Department has been
making every effort to work with [the father] for years. It
has offered him access to all the tools he could possibly
have required to rehabilitate and reunify, but, for whatever
reason, he has refused to avail himself of the services
offered. Finally, he has run out of time to begin trying in
time to meet his children's need for permanence and
stability.
. . . The Department has waited patiently for [the father] to
avail himself of services, any services, and only now, at the
eleventh hour, does he appear to be making a half-hearted
effort to do so. There is nothing more the Department can do
in discharging its responsibilities under Title 22 when a
parent like [the father] whose serious, ...