United States District Court, D. Maine
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
JOHN
A. WOODCOCK, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The
Court denies a plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of
its dispositive order because he failed to demonstrate that
the order was based on a manifest error of law or fact.
I.
BACKGROUND
On
October 14, 2014, Mr. Stile filed a complaint against
Cumberland County, the Cumberland County Sheriff, and twenty
Cumberland County corrections officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Compl. (ECF No. 1) (Cumberland
County Compl.). On September 28, 2018, the Court issued
an order on the Defendants' summary judgment motion.
Order on Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and Mot. for
Summ. J. (ECF No. 252) (Cumberland County
Order). On October 22, 2018, Mr. Stile filed a motion
for reconsideration on the Cumberland County Order. Mot.
for Recons. On Order on Summ. J. of Court. (ECF No. 259)
(Pl.'s Recons. Mot.).
That
same day, Defendants Bisson, LeBlanc, and Penenka filed an
interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals on
the Cumberland County Order. Notice of Appeal (ECF
No. 258). A week later, on October 29, 2018, Mr. Stile
appealed the Cumberland County Order to the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. Notice of Appeal (ECF No.
266).[1] On February 4, 2019, the First Circuit
granted the Defendants/Appellees' motion to dismiss Mr.
Stile's appeal. J. of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit at 1-2 (ECF No. 278). The
Defendants' interlocutory appeal remains pending.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Procedural Issues
Although
Mr. Stile titles his motion a motion for reconsideration, he
does not identify under what rule he brings his motion. The
Cumberland County Order was not a “final
judgment” because it did not resolve all the claims by
all the parties in this suit. See Riley v. Kennedy,
553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008) (quoting Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (“A final
judgment is one which ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment”) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 490 F.3d 31,
37 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that, absent
certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54, an order granting
partial summary judgment does not satisfy the requirements
for appellate jurisdiction”); Widi v. McNeil,
2:12-cv-00188-JAW, 2014 WL 4987969, *5 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2014).
As a result, Mr. Stile's motion cannot be brought under
either Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60 because
the Cumberland County Order was not a final judgment, and the
Court has not directed entry of a final judgment on any
claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
See Barrows v. Resolution Trust Corp., 39 F.3d 1166,
at *3 (1st Cir. 1994) (table opinion) (Rule 59(e)
“applies only to final judgments”); Farr Man
& Co. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 874 (1st Cir.
1990) (“Rule 60 applies only to final
judgments”); Widi, 2014 WL 4987969, at *5.
Mr.
Stile's motion must fall under the District of
Maine's Local Rule 7:
A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of the Court,
meaning a motion other than one governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59
or 60, shall demonstrate that the order was based on a
manifest error of fact or law and shall be filed within 14
days from the date of the order unless the party seeking a
reconsideration shows cause for not filing within that time.
D. Me. Loc. R. 7(f). As the Court issued its order on
September 28, 2018, a motion for reconsideration under Rule
7(f) was due on or before October 15, 2018. Mr. Stiles'
motion for reconsideration-dated October 18, 2018,
Pl.'s Recons. Mot. at 4-was docketed on October
22, 2018. Both fall outside of Local Rule 7(f)'s fourteen
day filing period, and ordinarily, the Court would dismiss
the motion for reconsideration as untimely.
However,
Mr. Stile is incarcerated, and it is not clear when he
received the Court's order; this impacts calculations
under the “prisoner mailbox rule” and whether his
motion was timely. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266
(1988); Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75,
78-79 (1st Cir. 2002). Even though Mr. Stile's motion may
be untimely and even though Mr. Stile has not otherwise shown
cause for not filing within Local Rule's 7(f)'s
timeframe, the Court will address the merits of his motion
given its uncertainty as to the timeliness of his motion.
B.
James Stile's Objections
Turning
to his contentions in his motion for reconsideration, Mr.
Stile's motion does not assert arguments that the
Cumberland County Order “was based on a manifest error
of fact or law.” D. Me. Loc. R. 7(f). ...