Stile v. Cumberland County Sheriff

          ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

          JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         The Court denies a plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of its dispositive order because he failed to demonstrate that the order was based on a manifest error of law or fact.

         I. BACKGROUND

         On October 14, 2014, Mr. Stile filed a complaint against Cumberland County, the Cumberland County Sheriff, and twenty Cumberland County corrections officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl. (ECF No. 1) (Cumberland County Compl.). On September 28, 2018, the Court issued an order on the Defendants' summary judgment motion. Order on Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings and Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 252) (Cumberland County Order). On October 22, 2018, Mr. Stile filed a motion for reconsideration on the Cumberland County Order. Mot. for Recons. On Order on Summ. J. of Court. (ECF No. 259) (Pl.'s Recons. Mot.).

         That same day, Defendants Bisson, LeBlanc, and Penenka filed an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals on the Cumberland County Order. Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 258). A week later, on October 29, 2018, Mr. Stile appealed the Cumberland County Order to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 266).^[1] On February 4, 2019, the First Circuit granted the Defendants/Appellees' motion to dismiss Mr. Stile's appeal. J. of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at 1-2 (ECF No. 278). The Defendants' interlocutory appeal remains pending.

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. Procedural Issues

         Although Mr. Stile titles his motion a motion for reconsideration, he does not identify under what rule he brings his motion. The Cumberland County Order was not a “final judgment” because it did not resolve all the claims by all the parties in this suit. See Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (“A final judgment is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 490 F.3d 31, 37 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that, absent certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54, an order granting partial summary judgment does not satisfy the requirements for appellate jurisdiction”); Widi v. McNeil, 2:12-cv-00188-JAW, 2014 WL 4987969, *5 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2014). As a result, Mr. Stile's motion cannot be brought under either Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60 because the Cumberland County Order was not a final judgment, and the Court has not directed entry of a final judgment on any claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Barrows v. Resolution Trust Corp., 39 F.3d 1166, at *3 (1st Cir. 1994) (table opinion) (Rule 59(e) “applies only to final judgments”); Farr Man & Co. v. M/V Rozita, 903 F.2d 871, 874 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Rule 60 applies only to final judgments”); Widi, 2014 WL 4987969, at *5.

         Mr. Stile's motion must fall under the District of Maine's Local Rule 7:

A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of the Court, meaning a motion other than one governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 or 60, shall demonstrate that the order was based on a manifest error of fact or law and shall be filed within 14 days from the date of the order unless the party seeking a reconsideration shows cause for not filing within that time.

D. Me. Loc. R. 7(f). As the Court issued its order on September 28, 2018, a motion for reconsideration under Rule 7(f) was due on or before October 15, 2018. Mr. Stiles' motion for reconsideration-dated October 18, 2018, Pl.'s Recons. Mot. at 4-was docketed on October 22, 2018. Both fall outside of Local Rule 7(f)'s fourteen day filing period, and ordinarily, the Court would dismiss the motion for reconsideration as untimely.

         However, Mr. Stile is incarcerated, and it is not clear when he received the Court's order; this impacts calculations under the “prisoner mailbox rule” and whether his motion was timely. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2002). Even though Mr. Stile's motion may be untimely and even though Mr. Stile has not otherwise shown cause for not filing within Local Rule's 7(f)'s timeframe, the Court will address the merits of his motion given its uncertainty as to the timeliness of his motion.

         B. James Stile's Objections

         Turning to his contentions in his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Stile's motion does not assert arguments that the Cumberland County Order “was based on a manifest error of fact or law.” D. Me. Loc. R. 7(f). ...