United States District Court, D. Maine
RYAN D. BURNETT, Plaintiff,
OCEAN PROPERTIES, LTD. and AMERIPORT, LLC, Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF
A. WOODCOCK, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
jury selected and trial looming in this Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) lawsuit, Ocean Properties Ltd. and
Ameriport, LLC (Ocean Properties) have moved in limine to
prohibit Ryan Burnett from introducing any evidence regarding
any damages other than injunctive relief, arguing that such
evidence is not relevant and is inadmissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 402.
THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
Properties seeks to preclude Ryan Burnett from offering any
evidence or argument before the jury that Ocean Properties is
liable for damages other than injunctive relief, because in
its view, Mr. Burnett failed to exhaust administrative
remedies on this issue. Defs.' Mot. in Limine to
Exclude Evidence and/or an Award of Damages or Relief Other
than Injunctive Relief at 2 (ECF No. 106)
(Defs.' Mot.). According to Ocean Properties,
evidence regarding damages other than injunctive relief is
not relevant, and should be excluded under Federal Rule of
remaining claim relates to Ocean Properties' alleged
failure to accommodate Mr. Burnett's August 28, 2014
request for automatic or “push-button” access to
his workplace at the golf club location. Ocean Properties
argues that Mr.
“never raised this discrete act in the charge of
discrimination he filed on June 29, 2015, and thus he is
precluded from recovering anything other than injunctive
relief on his claim.” Id. Ocean Properties
asserts that this Court determined in its order on the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment that the
Plaintiff's second request related to the doors was not
The failure to respond to the second request is an
independent discrete act which occurred within the 300-day
window because there is no evidence that Mr. Burnett knew or
reasonably should have known that AmeriPort was unlikely to
grant the request within the five days that elapsed between
the date of his second request and the start of the 300-day
Defs.' Mot at 3 (citing Order on Defs.'
Mot. for Summ. J. at 64) (ECF No. 81) (Summ. J.
Order)). Ocean Properties contends that Mr. Burnett did
not specifically address his August 28, 2014 request in his
EEOC Charge of Discrimination. Defs.' Mot. at 4.
According to Ocean Properties, because the act was not
time-barred, and not subsequently mentioned in his EEOC
charge, Mr. Burnett failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, and may not recover damages other than injunctive
relief. Id. at 5.
Ryan Burnett's Response
Burnett opposes the motion, and contests Ocean
Properties' assertion that he did not raise the wooden
door issue with adequate specificity in his EEOC Charge of
Discrimination. Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Mot. in
Limine to Exclude Evidence and/or an Award of Damages or
Relief Other than Injunctive Relief at 1 (ECF No. 117)
(Pl.'s Resp.). He points to the Court's
denial of Ocean Properties' motion to dismiss on failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. (citing
Order Dismissing Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
(ECF No. 37) (Mot. to Dismiss Order). Mr.
Burnett also states that the Court specifically found in its
order on the Defendant's motion for summary judgment that
“Mr. Burnett discussed the heavy wooden doors in his
Charge on June 29, 2015.” Id. (citing
Summ. J. Order at 64).
parties each contend that the Court already decided in their
favor as to whether Mr. Burnett failed to exhaust
administrative remedies with regard to the issue of the
wooden door. The Court disagrees. The parties misconstrue the
Court's previous orders on Ocean Properties' motions
to dismiss and for summary judgment.
motion to dismiss, Ocean Properties asserted that Mr.
Burnett's claims should be dismissed because he failed to
name Ocean Properties in his EEOC Charge and because he
failed to file a civil complaint against AmeriPort within
ninety days of receiving a notice of right to sue letter.
Mot. to Dismiss Order at 15. The Court rejected
these bases for dismissal, but this part of the Court's
order had ...