D. Warren Justice
the court is a motion by defendant Willow Home Owners
Association (Association) to dismiss the complaint in this
action because it is duplicative of a prior complaint filed
by plaintiff Dale Holman. The Association argues that the
only material difference is that Holman's new complaint
includes a request for a preliminary injunction, which
according to the Association fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
who is representing himself, has filed two other lawsuits
challenging actions taken by Julian and Katherine Johnson,
the Association, and various other parties with respect to
stormwater originating on property helonging to the Jewish
Community Alliance of Southern Maine in
Portland. As against the Association, Holman appears
to contend that allowing the discharge of stormwater into the
Association drainage system was illegal or improper.
could have simply filed a motion for a preliminary injunction
in CV-18-143 In commencing a new action and seeking a
preliminary injunction, however, Holman may have been relying
on the provision in M.R. Civ.P. 65(b)(1) that provides that
an application for a preliminary injunction "may be
included in the complaint or may be made by motion."
than the omission of allegations relating solely to parties
in CV-18-143 who are not named as defendants in RE-18-179,
there is virtually no difference between Holman's factual
allegations in CV-18-143 and his factual allegations in
RE-18-179. The only new material, which is contained in
paragraphs 44-60 and the attachments thereto, concerns
Holman's request for injunctive relief and his contention
that the Association has admitted that the Jewish Community
Alliance drainage has caused road damage that will require
court has reviewed the annexed documents referred to in
paragraphs 44-56 and finds no admissions or evidence in those
attachments that the road maintenance issues discussed in
those documents are linked with or caused by the Jewish
Community Alliance discharge into the Association drainage
system that is challenged by Holman in CV-18-68 and
the verified complaint in RE-18-179 as an application for a
preliminary injunction, the application is denied. Holman is
seeking a preliminary injunction preventing the Association
from spending any Association funds or billing any homeowners
while this action is pending. His reasoning is that the
defendants in CV-18-68 and CV-18-143 should be made to pay
for damage and remediation efforts. Complaint ¶¶
prerequisite for injunctive relief is irreparable harm, and
irreparable harm cannot be established if there is an
adequate remedy at law. In this case injunctive relief is
precluded because Holman's complaints in CV-18-68 and
CV-18-143 constitute an acknowledgment that Holman has an
adequate remedy at law.
60 of the complaint in RE-18-179 contains a conclusory
allegation that Holman and other homeowners will be subjected
to irreparable harm if they have to pay for damage and
remediation of structural water damage. It bears emphasis
that if he proves his claims, Holman may recover damages for
injury to his own property and any losses he has personally
incurred. Holman is entitled to represent himself, but he is
not entitled to represent other homeowners or sue on their
behalf. He makes no factual allegations suggesting that he
does not have an adequate remedy at law in the form of
Holman argues that an evidentiary hearing is necessary, the
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on an
application for a preliminary injunction and may rule on the
affidavits submitted or on the verified complaint. 3 C.
Harvey, Maine Civil Practice § 65:4 at 333
(2011). In this case, where Holman's verified complaint
falls short of any showing or irreparable harm - an
indispensable prerequisite for preliminary injunctive relief-
Holman's application may be denied without a hearing.
See, e.g., PCI Transportation Inc. v. Fort Worth &
Western Railroad Co., 418 F.3d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
the only aspect in RE-18-179 that is not already contained in
CV-18-143 is the application for a preliminary injunction,
RE-18-179 is dismissed as duplicative. See Geary v.
Stanley, 2007 ME 133 ¶¶ 14-16, 931 A.2d 1064.
Accord, Oxbow Energy Inc. v. Koch Industries Inc.,
686 F.Supp. 278, 280-82 (D. Kan. 1988), and cases cited
entry shall be:
the extent that plaintiff Dale Holman's verified
complaint in this action constitutes an application for a
preliminary injunction pursuant to M.R, Civ.P. 65(b)(1), the
application is denied.
all other material respects, the claims asserted in the
complaint are essentially identical to those asserted in
plaintiffs complaint in CV-18-143, and ...