Argued: June 13, 2018
Tina
Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather
Nadeau, PLLC, Portland, for Appellant J.R.
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Carie James, Asst.
Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine
Emma
E. Bond, Esq., Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., and Meagan S. Sway,
Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation,
Portland, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of
Maine Foundation
Panel:
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR,
HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
MEAD,
J.
[¶1]
J.R. appeals from the judgment of the District Court
(Skowhegan, Benson, /.), sitting as the juvenile
court, that adjudicated him of having committed two counts of
criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. §806(1)(A)
(2017), and three counts of theft (Class E), 17-A M.R.S.
§§ 353(1)(A), 359(1)(A) (2017). The court ordered
that J.R. be committed to the Long Creek Youth Development
Center (Long Creek) for an indeterminate period not to exceed
his eighteenth birthday. See 15 M.R.S. §§
3313(1)-(2), 3314(1), 3316(2) (2017). J.R. contends that the
court abused its discretion or otherwise erred when it
determined that commitment to a secure juvenile correctional
institution was the least restrictive dispositional
alternative available without explicitly finding that
J.R.'s commitment was necessary to protect the
public.[1] He further contends that his indeterminate
commitment until age eighteen is disproportionate punishment
because it potentially incarcerates him for a longer term
than the maximum length of a sentence for an adult convicted
of similar misdemeanor crimes. We affirm the judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
[¶2]
J.R. was born on March 3, 2001. He was fifteen when the State
filed, on January 13, 2017, the first of the three juvenile
petitions that are the subject of this appeal. In docket
number SKODC-JV-17-0005 (17-0005), the State alleged that, on
November 15, 2016, J.R. "receive[d], retain[ed], or
dispose[d] of a scooter, ... knowing it had been stolen, or
believing probably that it had been stolen, with the intent
to deprive [the owner] of the property," and that he
damaged the scooter by "painting" the number
"420" on it. The petition in 17-0005 charged J.R.
with theft by receiving stolen property (Class E), 17-AM.R.S.
§359(1)(A), and criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.
§806(1)(A).
[¶3]
On February 27, 2017, J.R. appeared at an initial hearing and
denied both charges. The court ordered his release on the
conditions that he (1) refrain from any illegal acts,
including the use of alcohol or illegal drugs; (2) remain
under house arrest when not at school, travelling to or from
school, or under the supervision of his parents or someone
approved by his Juvenile Community Corrections Officer
(JCCO); (3) have no contact with the owner of the scooter or
the juveniles involved in its theft or reporting it stolen to
the police; and (4) report regularly to his JCCO. The court
set the matter for an adjudicatory hearing on April 10, 2017.
[¶4]
Before that next hearing occurred, however, the State filed a
second petition, which was entered in docket number
SKODC-JV-17-0021 (17-0021). The petition charged J.R. with
aggravated criminal mischief (Class C), 17-AM.R.S. §
805(1)(A) (2017), alleging that on February 19, 2017, he
"did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly damage or
destroy windows, doors and surveillance cameras,"
causing in excess of $2, 000 in damage at a public school. On
April 10, 2017, at the time the court had previously set for
the adjudicatory hearing in 17-0005, J.R. initially appeared
and denied the aggravated criminal mischief charge. The court
released J.R. under the same conditions it had previously
imposed, with the added requirements that J.R. (1) submit to
searches or tests for possession or use of drugs or alcohol,
(2) set up case management services, and (3) attend
individual counseling. The court [Mathews, /.)
continued the adjudicatory hearing in both matters to June
12, 2017. The State agreed to conditions of release and to a
two-month continuance of the adjudicatory hearing in docket
number 17-0005 to "try and treat [J.R.] in the
community," with the understanding that "if he
attended and participated in . . . counseling, then [it]
would [have] recommend[ed] ... a probation[ary] sentence and
... restitution."
[¶5]
In the period following the continuance, however, J.R. did
not meaningfully participate in services. He attended only a
few brief counseling sessions, which the counselor then
discontinued due to J.R.'s lack of engagement. When J.R.
failed to appear at the adjudicatory hearing on June 12, the
court ordered a warrant for his arrest and subsequent
detention, which issued later that month. While J.R.'s
whereabouts were unknown, the State filed a third petition
against him. That petition, entered in SKODC-JV-17-0034
(17-0034), charged J.R. with burglary (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 401(1)(B)(4) (2017), and two counts of theft by
unauthorized taking or transfer (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. §
353(1)(A). The State alleged that on June 8, 2017, J.R. broke
through the front door of his brother's apartment and
stole a safe containing money, marijuana, and documents
belonging to his brother and the brother's roommate. On
July 25, 2017, a second arrest warrant issued for J.R.
[¶6]
On October 12, 2017, law enforcement took J.R. into custody
and, after a hearing the next day, the court
[Benson, /.) ordered him to remain detained until
the adjudicatory hearing later in the month. See 15
M.R.S. § 3203-A(5) (2017). At the adjudicatory hearing,
the parties informed the court that J.R. intended to withdraw
his previous pleas and tender an "open plea"
admitting to the criminal mischief and theft charges in
17-0005 and to a drug paraphernalia charge, which is not a
subject of this appeal.[2] In exchange, the State declined to
proceed on the aggravated criminal mischief or burglary
charges against J.R.; it amended the aggravated criminal
mischief charge in 17-0021 to simple criminal mischief and
dismissed the burglary charge in 17-0034, leaving only
misdemeanor charges in those dockets.
[¶7]
After J.R. admitted to the offenses of receiving stolen
property and criminal mischief in 17-0005 and the amended
charges of unauthorized taking in 17-0034 and criminal
mischief in 17-0021, the court found, based upon a thorough
colloquy with J.R., that "his admissions [were] knowing
and voluntary." The court then proceeded to determine an
appropriate disposition.
[¶8]
Regarding the disposition of J.R.'s case, the court and
the State expressed that their ultimate objective was
"rehabilitation of the juvenile." The court further
explained that, to fulfill the overarching intent of the
Maine Juvenile Code, "the Court is bound to impose the
least restrictive dispositional alternative." The court
rejected the possibility of a straight probationary
disposition, stating "there's just no indication
that ... if I were to [order probation] . . . that [it] would
succeed." The court was apparently-and
appropriately-frustrated by a lack of suitable alternatives
for treating J.R. in the community: "Looking at [the
factors for withholding an institutional disposition],
everyone up to this point has bent over backwards in order to
impose the least restrictive alternative so that you could
try to succeed And up to this point, you just haven't
justified the confidence."
[¶9]
The court ordered that J.R. be committed to an approved
juvenile detention facility for an indeterminate period not
to exceed his eighteenth birthday. J.R. timely appealed. 15
M.R.S. §§ 3402-3403 (2017); M.R. App. P. 2B.
II.
DISCUSSION
[¶10]
J.R. argues that the court abused its discretion and
otherwise erred[3] when it determined that a disposition
committing him to Long Creek was the least restrictive
alternative, absent any explicit finding that his commitment
was necessary to protect the public. See 15 M.R.S.
§§ 3002(1)(A), 3313-3314 (2017). J.R. also argues
that his commitment to Long Creek offends constitutional
principles of proportional punishment. Pursuant to 15 M.R.S.
§§3401(2) and 3402(1)(B) (2017), we review a
juvenile disposition for an abuse of discretion and
"errors in the application and interpretation of
law," "[t]o [e]nsure substantial uniformity of
treatment to persons in like situations," and "so
that the legislatively defined purposes of the juvenile
justice system as a whole are realized." See State
v. G.F., 2015 ME 90, ¶¶ 2-3, 119 A.3d 743. We
begin by reviewing the purposes behind juvenile dispositions
and comparing those purposes to the notably different
objectives for the sentencing of adult defendants. We then
separately address the arguments regarding the least
restrictive alternative and proportionality.
A. The
Maine Juvenile Code
[¶11]
The juvenile court correctly noted the Maine Juvenile
Code's stated preference for keeping juveniles in the
home, whenever possible, and its emphasis upon
rehabilitation. Title 15 M.R.S. § 3002(1) (2017)
provides the purposes of the Juvenile Code:
A. To secure for each juvenile subject to these provisions
such care and guidance, preferably in the juvenile's own
home, as will best serve the juvenile's welfare and the
interests of society;
B. To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible,
including improvement of home environment;
C. To remove a juvenile from the custody of the
juvenile's parents only when the juvenile's welfare
and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be
endangered or, when necessary, to punish a child adjudicated,
pursuant to chapter 507, as having committed a juvenile
crime;
D. To secure for any juvenile removed from the custody of the
juvenile's parents the necessary treatment, care,
guidance and discipline to assist that juvenile in becoming a
responsible and productive member of society;
E. To provide procedures through which the provisions of the
law are executed and enforced and that ensure that the
parties receive fair hearings at which their rights as
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