Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Israel v. Israel

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit

June 7, 2018


          Before, Howard, Chief Judge, Souter, Associate Justice, [*] Torruella, Baldock, [**] Lynch, Thompson, Kayatta, and Barron, Circuit Judges.


         Appellee Congregation Jeshuat Israel's (CJI) petition for rehearing having been denied by the panel of judges who decided the case, and the petition for rehearing en banc having been submitted to the active judges of this court and a majority of the judges not having voted that the case be heard en banc, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc be denied.

          SOUTER, Associate Justice, joined by Baldock and Lynch, Circuit Judges, statement regarding denial of panel rehearing.

         The panel includes the following response in the panel's vote to deny rehearing.

         The rehearing petitioner, CJI, appears to assert at one point (p. 8) that the panel opinion holds that in litigation of religious property disputes "the trier-of-fact must consider only 'deeds, charters [and] contracts, ' to the exclusion of all other secular evidence." This is an erroneous characterization of the panel opinion, which holds only that when such items of evidence "and the like are available and to the point . . . they should be the lodestones of adjudication in these cases."

         The holding does not otherwise purport to impose any categorical limitation on competent evidence in such cases.

         Both CJI and the Attorney General of Rhode Island, in the brief supporting CJI, misstate that the panel opinion holds that CSI is free of any trust obligation as owner of the real and personal property subject to dispute. The court holds no such thing. The opening paragraph summarizes the holding that CSI holds the property "free of any civilly cognizable trust obligations to CJI" (emphasis added), and the more detailed conclusions at the end, in part III, state the holding to be "as between the parties in this case." The opinion does not address the possibility of a trust obligation to a non-CJI Newport "Jewish society" as beneficiary. No such claimant was a party in the litigation, and no such issue was resolved explicitly or implicitly by the panel. As indicated above, the opinion neither states nor implies any particular limitation on the scope of admissible evidence in any further litigation brought by a trust claimant other than CJI. In sum, the panel holding is consistent with the Attorney General's observation that CJI may not be the exclusive beneficiary of any trust there may be, and the holding is limited to the present parties, their controversies and their particular, contractual and contractually documented relationship.

         The mischaracterization of the holding as applying to possible claimants other than CJI leads to a further assertion by the Attorney General that the (erroneously characterized) global ruling that CSI has no possible trust obligation to anyone or to any "Jewish society" other than CJI violates the Rhode Island rule of trust common law, that one public charitable trust beneficiary cannot effectively consent to the termination of the trust, to the prejudice of any other beneficiaries. Since the erroneous statement about the scope of the panel's holding is the premise for invoking this rule of trust law, the rule has no application.

         With respect to the dissent from denial of en banc rehearing, the panel notes that the scope of its review of the trial court's findings is limited by the dispositive significance of the record evidence of the present parties' contractually established relationship. Accordingly, the panel holding of that dispositive character under controlling federal law in this case implies no limitation on the relevance of any rule of Rhode Island law or of any item of evidence that might be raised or offered by a party other than CJI in support of a claim to a trust benefit, the possible details of which are not before us.

          THOMPSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc.

         I dissent from the order denying the petition for rehearing en banc because I am concerned that my colleagues' opinion thwarts our well-established standard of review for a district court's decision following a bench trial and because my colleagues haven't discussed long-standing Rhode Island law that could lead to different legal conclusions in the fact-intensive issues presented by this difficult case.

         On a de novo review, a panel is certainly entitled to engage in a different analytical approach to the legal issues than that explored by the trial judge. But the panel engages its review without first establishing how the trial judge's findings of fact clearly erred. This strikes me as at odds with our established standard of review when we are presented with a decision issued after a bench trial. Traditionally, questions of law are determined de novo, but factual findings are reviewed for clear error only. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 98 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Thompson, J. dissenting) (citing Wojciechowicz v. United States, 582 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2009)). To that end, we are supposed to "accept the court's factual findings, and the inferences drawn from those facts, unless the evidence compels us to conclude a mistake was made." Id. (citing Janeiro v. Urological Surgery Prof'l Ass'n, 457 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 2006)). When an appeal presents issues that involve both legal and factual inquiries, our review slides along a continuum; "[t]he more fact-intensive the question, the more deferential our review" whereas "the more law-dominated the query, the more likely our review is de novo." Id. (citing Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., 63 F.3d 1129, 1132 (1st Cir. 1995)).

         As the trial judge's decision shows, this case is clearly fact intensive and involves events and documents that go back a few centuries. While the panel credits him for his "conscientious and exhaustive historical analy[tical]" approach to the competing claims and for "scrupulous[ly] . . . avoiding any overt reliance on doctrinal precepts, " it then engages in a de novo review of the entire case without demonstrating any deference to his findings of fact and without declaring, never mind demonstrating, that the trial judge's findings of fact are clearly wrong. After acknowledging the trial judge's effort, they pivot to their analysis with a simple "[t]hese are circumstances in which we think that the First Amendment calls for a more circumscribed consideration of evidence than the trial court's plenary enquiry into centuries of the parties' conduct by examining their internal documentation that had been generated without resort to the formalities of the civil law."

         The panel proceeds to emphasize secular documents such as deeds, charters, contracts, and the like as "the lodestones of adjudication" in cases such as this one where the court is tasked with resolving a property dispute while dodging improper entanglement in a religious controversy. Indeed, the trial judge's comprehensive and thorough decision highlights several such documents that are part of the voluminous record in this case. But the panel only picked four contracts to support its conclusion that "CSI owns both the [R]imonim and the real property free of any civilly cognizable trust obligations to CJI": a settlement agreement from earlier litigation between CSI and CJI; a lease between the parties; an agreement between the parties and the then-Acting Secretary of the Interior about the preservation of the property as one of national historical significance; and an agreement between CJI, the Society of Friends of Touro Synagogue, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation spelling out the terms for operating the property as a historic site. While diving deep into these four contracts, the panel summarily dismisses a couple of documents the trial ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.