Argued: March 6, 2018
Aranson, Esq. (orally), South Portland, for appellant William
E. Plante, Jr.
Kathryn M. Slattery, District Attorney, and Thaddeus W. West,
Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District #1,
Alfred, for appellee State of Maine.
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
William C. Plante has brought this direct appeal from a
sentence requiring him to pay $7, 500 in restitution based on
his involvement in extensively damaging rental property from
which he was evicted. The sentence, entered by the court
(York County, Douglas, /.) upon Plante's nolo
contendere plea to criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.
§806(1)(A), (2) (2017), required only the payment of
restitution and a mandatory payment to the Victims'
Compensation Fund. See 5 M.R.S. § 3360-1
(2017). Aside from those requirements, Plante was
unconditionally discharged. See 17-A M.R.S. §
1346 (2017). Because Plante does not properly assert that
there is any illegality apparent on the record but instead
challenges the factual and discretionary determinations of
the court-decisions that we do not review in a direct appeal
of a sentence-we dismiss his appeal.
In April 2015, Plante was charged by indictment with
aggravated criminal mischief (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. §
8O5(1)(A), (2) (2017). He initially pleaded not guilty, but
in May 2016, he entered a plea of nolo contendere to criminal
mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A), (2), and
the State dismissed the count of aggravated criminal
The State sought a judgment imposing restitution but no jail
time or probation. After an evidentiary hearing regarding the
amount of the victim's loss and Plante's capacity to
pay restitution, the court found that, although Plante lacked
the present capacity to pay restitution, he failed to prove
that he lacked the future capacity to pay. See 17-A
M.R.S. § l325(1)(C), (2)(D), (4) (2017). The resulting
judgment, entered in May 2017, required Plante to begin
paying a $7, 500 restitution obligation at a rate of $25 per
month. The judgment required Plante to begin making payments
in June 2018, a full year after sentencing. The court
expressly stated that, if Plante remained unable to begin
paying by June 2018, he could move to modify the restitution
order. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1328-A (2017). The
court also ordered Plante to pay $20 to the Victims'
Compensation Fund and sentenced him to an unconditional
discharge. See 5 M.R.S. § 3360-1; 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1346. The court denied Plante's subsequent motion
for correction or reduction of his sentence. See
M.R.U. Crim. P. 35.
Plante did not petition for a discretionary review of that
denial. M.R. App. P. 19(a)(2)(A), (c) (Tower
2016). He appealed the sentence to us directly,
arguing that the court erred in its factual findings or
abused its discretion in determining his capacity to pay
restitution. See M.R. App. P. 2 (Tower 2016).
In a direct appeal, we do not review the propriety of a
sentencing court's factual findings or discretionary
determinations. State v. Davenport, 2016 ME 69,
¶¶ 8, 9, 138 A.3d 1205. To obtain review of those
aspects of a sentence, a defendant must have been
"sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or
more, " 15 M.R.S. § 2151, and must have applied for
sentence review, "with an appeal following only if the
Sentence Review Panel authorizes the appeal in its
discretion, " Davenport, 2016 ME 69, ¶ 8,
138 A.3d 1205. See M.R. App. P. 20 (Tower 2016);
M.R. App. P. 20 (restyled). Because Plante was not sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of at least one year, he could not
pursue such sentence review. See 15 M.R.S. §
2151; State v. Bennett, 2015 ME 46, ¶¶
10-11, 114 A.3d 994.
A direct appeal of a sentence, including a sentence to pay
restitution, is properly before us only if a defendant
identifies an illegality, such as a constitutional or
statutory violation,  that is apparent from the record.
State v. Bean, 2018 ME 58, ¶ 25, __A.3d __;
Davenport, 2016 ME 69, ¶ 9, 138 A.3d 1205.
Plante has attempted to argue that we must consider his
direct appeal to protect his rights of equal protection and
due process. He presented these constitutional arguments only
in his reply brief, however, and then in an undeveloped
manner, without citation to supporting legal authority that
would make an illegality apparent on the face of the record.
See Lincoln v. Burbank, 2016 ME 138, ¶ 41, 147
A.3d 1165; Davenport, 2016 ME 69, ¶¶ 8, 9,
138 A.3d 1205; State v. Lowe, 2015 ME 124, ¶ 23
n.6, 124 A.3d 156.
Because Plante did not argue and present legal authority to
demonstrate any illegality, his appeal is in essence a
challenge to "the court's findings or discretionary
determinations, " which we do not review on direct
appeal. Davenport,2016 ME 69, ¶¶ 8, 9,
138 A.3d 1205. Accordingly, we dismiss Plante's appeal.
We note, however, that the trial court should correct the