United States District Court, D. Maine
RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
John
C. Nivison, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
In this
action, Plaintiff Jeffrey Barnard alleges, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights during an encounter on May 31, 2014.
The matter is before the Court on Defendant Scott Duff's
Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 43.)
Through
his motion, Defendant Duff contends that given
Plaintiff's allegations and given the Court's
findings at Plaintiff's sentencing on a criminal charge
arising out of the encounter, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his
claim against Defendant Duff.[1]
After
review and consideration of the motion and the relevant
filings, I recommend the Court deny the motion.
Background
Facts
The
facts set forth herein are derived from Plaintiff's
amended complaint. (ECF No. 16.) The factual allegations of
the amended complaint are deemed true when evaluating the
motion to dismiss. McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59
(1st Cir. 2017).
In May
2014, Plaintiff and his wife lived in their mobile home,
which was located on property owned by a third party.
Pursuant to an agreement with the landowner, Plaintiff had
use of the landowner's tractor. (Am. Compl. ¶¶
11 - 12.) Sometime in May 2014, a dispute arose between
Plaintiff and the landowner over possession of the tractor,
which dispute evidently prompted the landowner to call the
Ellsworth Police Department for assistance. Officer Barton
Tokas came to the property and, after learning of the nature
of the dispute, instructed the landowner and Plaintiff that
the dispute was a civil matter and should be handled
accordingly. (Id. ¶ 13.)
On or
about May 31, 2014, the landowner again sought assistance
from the Ellsworth Police Department. (Id. ¶
14.) Officer Troy Bires first arrived at the scene, and
Officer Tokas arrived shortly thereafter. (Id.
¶ 15.) The landowner had arranged for a man to go to the
property with a flatbed trailer to remove the tractor from
the property. Plaintiff intervened and removed the key from
the tractor while the man was operating the tractor, thereby
preventing the man from taking the tractor. The encounter
included some physical contact between Plaintiff and the
person attempting to retrieve the tractor. (Id.
¶ 16.)
When
questioned by Officer Bires, Plaintiff told Officer Bires
that it was a civil matter. After speaking with the other
individual, Officer Bires returned to Plaintiff's home
and knocked on the door. According to Plaintiff, when he
partially opened the door, Officer Bires drew his firearm,
pointed it at Plaintiff, and instructed Plaintiff to show the
hand obstructed by the door. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff asserts that after Officer Bires repeated the
command, Plaintiff complied, and Officer Bires, with his
weapon still pointed at Plaintiff, told Plaintiff to turn
over the key. (Id. ¶ 19.) When Plaintiff
protested, Officer Bires told Plaintiff that if he did not
turn over the key, he would be arrested for theft and
assault. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to turn over the
key. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Officer
Bires holstered his weapon and left, but advised Plaintiff
that he would return. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff
then took a five gallon gas canister that was near his entry
and carried it into the mobile home. (Id.)
Shortly
thereafter, Officer Tokas called out Plaintiff's name.
(Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff and Officer Tokas
communicated through the doorway. When Officer Tokas directed
Plaintiff to turn over the key, Plaintiff reminded Officer
Tokas that he previously told Plaintiff that the dispute was
a civil matter. (Id.) Officer Tokas told Plaintiff
he needed to return the key or he would be arrested.
(Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff then showed Officer Tokas
the gas can and threatened to use it if law enforcement
attempted to enter his home by force. (Id.)
For the
next 20 hours, Plaintiff and the police were in a standoff.
(Id.) The standoff ended on June 1, 2014, at
approximately 4:20 a.m., when, after Plaintiff exited the
home, Defendant Duff shot Plaintiff. (Id.) The
parties dispute whether Plaintiff possessed a rifle and
raised it in the direction of law enforcement prior to the
shooting.
Following
Plaintiff's arrest, the United States prosecuted
Plaintiff for the unlawful possession of a firearm, based on
Plaintiff's status as a convicted felon.[2] United States
v. Barnard, No. 1:14-cr-00088-JAW. Plaintiff pleaded
guilty to the charge. At Plaintiff's sentencing hearing
on January 4, 2017, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1), the Court made certain findings of fact
concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense. As
part of its assessment, the Court found that during the
standoff Plaintiff discharged a firearm multiple times when
he was in the mobile home, and that immediately prior to
being shot, Plaintiff emerged from his home and raised a
rifle. (Motion to Dismiss Ex. D, Sent. Tr. at 153:8-11,
154:6-14, 157:14-16, 159:1 - 160:10, ECF No. 45.)
Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may seek
dismissal of “a claim for relief in any pleading”
if that party believes that the pleading fails “to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In its
assessment of the motion, a court must “assume the
truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff[] the
benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom.”
Blanco v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 802 F.Supp.2d 215,
221 (D. Me. 2011) (quoting Genzyme Corp. v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 622 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2010)). A court may also
“supplement those facts with facts ‘gleaned from
… matters of public record, and facts susceptible to
judicial notice.'” Gonzalez v. Velez, 864
F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Haley v. City of
Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)). To overcome
the motion, Plaintiff must establish that his allegations
raise a plausible basis for a fact finder to conclude that
the defendant is legally responsible for the alleged claim.
Blanco, 802 F.Supp.2d at 221.
B.
Defendant Duff's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant
Duff argues dismissal is warranted because (1) a finding for
Plaintiff would impermissibly invalidate Plaintiff's
sentence in the related criminal matter, and (2) given the
Court's sentencing findings, Plaintiff cannot prevail on
his claims.[3] (Motion at 1 - 2, 8 - 11, 11 - 15.)
1.
Effect on Plaintiff's Sentence
Defendant
Duff argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's
claim because any finding in Plaintiff's favor would
impermissibly implicate the duration of Plaintiff's
federal sentence.
In
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the
Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot bring a
§ 1983 claim if “the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate or a speedier
release, ” and that the sole federal remedy in such a
case is a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 500. In
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme
Court held that a state prisoner could not maintain a §
1983 claim for damages where he alleged that his arrest,
trial, and conviction were unconstitutional because an award
of damages on such a claim would implicitly invalidate the
conviction. Because the plaintiff challenged his conviction,
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must first obtain
relief from the conviction through state or federal habeas
proceedings, or similar proceedings, before seeking a remedy
under § 1983. Id. at 487.
More
recently, the Supreme Court explained that its decisions on
the issue, “taken together, indicate that a state
prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior
invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's
suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings) - if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,
81 - 82 (2005)[4] (emphasis in original).
Although
the Supreme Court precedent involves claims of state court
convicted prisoners, courts have extended the Supreme
Court's rationale to civil rights claims brought by
federal prisoners if the claims involve matters that are
traditionally the subject of habeas corpus proceedings or
direct appeals. Skinner v. U.S. Dep't of Justice
& Bureau of Prisons, 584 F.3d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (involving challenge to federal BOP's revocation of
good time credits); Beverly v. Reno, 23 F.3d 158,
159 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving claim that federal statute
under which the plaintiff was convicted was
unconstitutional). Under this reasoning, in a claim asserted
by a federal prisoner, such as Plaintiff, the issues are
whether the claim asserted in the § 1983 action could be
pursued in a § 2255 habeas petition[5] and, if so,
whether success on the asserted § 1983 claim would
necessarily invalidate the prisoner's sentence. For
instance, in Davis v. U.S. Sentencing Commission,
716 F.3d 660 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the district court held that a
federal prisoner could proceed with claims asserted under the
Declaratory Judgment Act and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), without first pursuing habeas relief, where the
prisoner's contention was that certain amendments to the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional. The court
concluded the claim was actionable because success on the
claim would not “necessarily imply the invalidity of
[his] confinement or shorten its duration.”
Id. at 666 (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at
82). The invalidity of the sentence or its duration was not
necessarily implied, the court reasoned, because success on
the prisoner's claim “would do no more than allow
him to seek a sentence reduction, which the district court
retains the discretion to deny.” Id. (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
Here,
Defendant Duff argues Plaintiff cannot proceed on his §
1983 claim because in order to prevail on the claim,
Plaintiff must obtain a finding that is inconsistent with the
Court's determination that immediately before Defendant
Duff shot Plaintiff, Plaintiff exited his home with a rifle
and raised the rifle. Defendant contends that such a finding
would necessarily implicate Plaintiff's sentence.
Defendant's argument is unpersuasive.
Even if
the Court assumes Plaintiff could challenge in a habeas
proceeding the Court's factual finding at sentencing, a
finding in Plaintiff's favor on his § 1983 claim
does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence. Although the Court found that Plaintiff
possessed and raised a rifle when he exited his home, the
length of sentence was discretionary and the Court cited
additional factors when, in establishing the sentence, the
Court determined that Plaintiff's conduct created a
substantial risk to the safety of others. The Court thus
conceivably could have imposed the same sentence without
finding that Plaintiff raised his rifle when he exited his
home.[6] In short, contrary to Defendant's
contention, a finding in favor of Plaintiff would not
implicate the validity of Plaintiff's sentence.
2.
Effect of the Court's ...