Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Pedersen v. Fairpoint Communications, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Maine

March 9, 2018

MARLO PEDERSEN, Plaintiff
v.
FAIRPOINT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and FAIRPOINT LOGISTICS, INC., Defendants

          MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

          JOHN H. RICH III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         In this action alleging workplace sex discrimination and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements Act (“MFMLRA”), the plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for promissory estoppel. See Plaintiff['s] Motion for Leave To Amend Complaint (“Motion”) (ECF No. 10) at 1. For the reasons that follow, I grant the Motion.

         I. Applicable Legal Standards

         Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend should be granted in the absence of reasons “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc ..... ” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

         The First Circuit has explained:

A motion to amend a complaint will be treated differently depending on its timing and the context in which it is filed. . . . As a case progresses, and the issues are joined, the burden on a plaintiff seeking to amend a complaint becomes more exacting. Scheduling orders, for example, typically establish a cut-off date for amendments (as was apparently the case here). Once a scheduling order is in place, the liberal default rule is replaced by the more demanding “good cause” standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b). This standard focuses on the diligence (or lack thereof) of the moving party more than it does on any prejudice to the party-opponent. Where the motion to amend is filed after the opposing party has timely moved for summary judgment, a plaintiff is required to show “substantial and convincing evidence” to justify a belated attempt to amend a complaint.

Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2004) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnotes omitted).

         The plaintiff filed the Motion on January 30, 2018, see Motion at 3, after the expiration of the parties' January 5, 2018, deadline to amend pleadings, see Scheduling Order (ECF No. 5) at 2. Therefore, the “good cause” rule applies.

         II. Factual Background

         The operative complaint alleges that the plaintiff was employed by the defendants as a supply chain database analyst from May 2009 to May 2016. See Complaint (“Operative Complaint”) (ECF No. 3-3), attached to Affidavit of Mark V. Franco (ECF No. 3), ¶¶ 5-17. The plaintiff was pregnant in 2015, and, in or about April 2015, the defendants granted her request for leave, which began in May 2015. See Id. ¶¶ 7, 10-11.

         The defendants' agent with regard to the leave was the Reed Group. See Id. ¶ 12. The Reed Group confirmed on multiple occasions that the plaintiff's leave would be extended through August 2, 2016. See Id. ¶ 13. The defendants told the plaintiff that, upon the expiration of her leave, she would be able to return to her job on “the same terms and conditions” that were in place at the beginning of her leave. Id. ¶ 14. The defendants refused the plaintiff's requests that, following her leave, she be allowed to telecommute, as she had on a part-time basis before her leave, and that she be provided a “mother's room” at the workplace. Id. ¶¶ 8, 15-16. On May 16, 2016, during the course of the plaintiff's authorized leave, she was notified that her employment had been terminated effective May 3, 2016. See Id. ¶ 17.

         The plaintiff timely filed a charge of discrimination against the defendants with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which provided her with a right-to-sue letter dated August 22, 2017. See Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

         III. Discussion

         A. Diligence in Seeking To Assert ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.