United States District Court, D. Maine
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND
H. RICH III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
action alleging workplace sex discrimination and retaliation
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
and the Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements Act
(“MFMLRA”), the plaintiff seeks leave to amend
her complaint to add a claim for promissory estoppel.
See Plaintiff['s] Motion for Leave To Amend
Complaint (“Motion”) (ECF No. 10) at 1. For the
reasons that follow, I grant the Motion.
Applicable Legal Standards
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “[t]he
court should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when
justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Leave to
amend should be granted in the absence of reasons “such
as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc ..... ” Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
First Circuit has explained:
A motion to amend a complaint will be treated differently
depending on its timing and the context in which it is filed.
. . . As a case progresses, and the issues are joined, the
burden on a plaintiff seeking to amend a complaint becomes
more exacting. Scheduling orders, for example, typically
establish a cut-off date for amendments (as was apparently
the case here). Once a scheduling order is in place, the
liberal default rule is replaced by the more demanding
“good cause” standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b). This
standard focuses on the diligence (or lack thereof) of the
moving party more than it does on any prejudice to the
party-opponent. Where the motion to amend is filed after the
opposing party has timely moved for summary judgment, a
plaintiff is required to show “substantial and
convincing evidence” to justify a belated attempt to
amend a complaint.
Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 11-12
(1st Cir. 2004) (citations, internal quotation marks, and
plaintiff filed the Motion on January 30, 2018, see
Motion at 3, after the expiration of the parties' January
5, 2018, deadline to amend pleadings, see Scheduling
Order (ECF No. 5) at 2. Therefore, the “good
cause” rule applies.
operative complaint alleges that the plaintiff was employed
by the defendants as a supply chain database analyst from May
2009 to May 2016. See Complaint (“Operative
Complaint”) (ECF No. 3-3), attached to Affidavit of
Mark V. Franco (ECF No. 3), ¶¶ 5-17. The plaintiff
was pregnant in 2015, and, in or about April 2015, the
defendants granted her request for leave, which began in May
2015. See Id. ¶¶ 7, 10-11.
defendants' agent with regard to the leave was the Reed
Group. See Id. ¶ 12. The Reed Group confirmed
on multiple occasions that the plaintiff's leave would be
extended through August 2, 2016. See Id. ¶ 13.
The defendants told the plaintiff that, upon the expiration
of her leave, she would be able to return to her job on
“the same terms and conditions” that were in
place at the beginning of her leave. Id. ¶ 14.
The defendants refused the plaintiff's requests that,
following her leave, she be allowed to telecommute, as she
had on a part-time basis before her leave, and that she be
provided a “mother's room” at the workplace.
Id. ¶¶ 8, 15-16. On May 16, 2016, during
the course of the plaintiff's authorized leave, she was
notified that her employment had been terminated effective
May 3, 2016. See Id. ¶ 17.
plaintiff timely filed a charge of discrimination against the
defendants with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which
provided her with a right-to-sue letter dated August 22,
2017. See Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
Diligence in Seeking To Assert ...