F.C. BEACON GROUP, INC. Plaintiff
CRAIG BELANGER et als. Defendants
ELIZABETH KAYATTA, ESQ ARROWOOD PETERS.
KLINE, ESQ KLINE LAW OFFICES.
ADRIANNE FOUTS, ESQ DRUMMOND WOODSUM.
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
civil action involves claims by F. C. Beacon Group, Inc.
["Beacon"], a management consulting firm, against
four former employees and the current employers of those
former employees, alleging violation of employment
agreements, misappropriation of trade secrets, among other
the court is the Motion to Dismiss and, Alternatively, Motion
for More Definite Statement filed by Defendants Craig
Belanger, Richard Crumb, Rachel Eschle and their current
employer, BCE Partners, LLC [hereinafter "the BCE
parties''] and the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendant Meaghan Flood and her employer, Anchor Research,
LLC [hereinafter "the Anchor parties"]. The motions
are opposed. The court elects to decide the motions without
oral argument. SeeM.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(7).
motion to dismiss under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) requires the
court to decide whether the pleading to which the motion is
directed states a cognizable claim for relief, viewing the
allegations in a light favorable to the non-moving party.
See Town of Eddington v. University of 'Maine
Foundation, 2007 ME 74, ¶5, 926 A.2d 183, 184;
Heber v. Lucerne-in-Me. Vill. Corp., 2000 ME 137,
¶7, 755 A.2d 1064, 1066.
motions also challenge the complaint as being insufficiently
specific or particular in certain respects. As the Law Court
has observed, "Maine is a notice pleading state, . . .
only requir[ing] a short and plain statement of the claim to
provide fair notice of the cause of action."
Johnston v. Me. Energy Recovery Co., 2010 ME 52,
¶ 16, 19 A.3d 823.
parties' motion contends that all six counts of the
complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The Anchor parties' motion is directed to Counts II, III
and V. In the court's view, for the reasons stated below,
Counts I, II, IV, V and VI are not insufficient, viewed in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Count I of the complaint, for breach of contract, does
sufficiently allege the existence of contracts between Beacon
and the individual BCE parties as well as actions in breach.
The BCE parties' claim that the contracts should be
governed by California law is contrary to the choice of law
provision alleged to be in the contracts. On this record, the
court is not persuaded that California law should be applied.
Only one of the individual BCE parties, Mr. Crumb, is alleged
to be a California resident, and if the BCE parties chose to
form BCE Partners, LLC under California law, that does not
necessarily mean that California law governs. The factual
predicate for the application of California law on any legal
issue is not yet before the court. The BCE parties'
motion to dismiss will be denied as to Count I.
Count II of the complaint, which alleges misappropriation
ofotected trade secrets. However, paragraph 90 of the
complaint defines, in considerable detail, what Bea trade
secrets, both of the motions to dismiss contend that the
complaint lacks any specifics as to how Beacon defines its
prcon deems to be its "confidential information, "
and paragraph 92 designates the defined confidential
information as being Beacon's protected "trade
secrets." Plainly, not all of the designated material
may qualify as trade secrets, but it is defined in
sufficiently particular terms to put the BCE parties on
notice of what Beacon claims to be protected.
complaint is admittedly less than particular in terms of
alleging exactly what the defendants are supposed to have
misappropriated, but it need not be more particular than it
is. The BCE parties' motion seeks a more definite
statement as an alternative to dismissal, but the complaint
is sufficiently definite-the ...