Torruella, Lynch, and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Efraín Pagán-Walker ("Pagán")
entered into a written plea agreement for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), after a lawful police search discovered a
gun and ammunition in his home: a .40-caliber Glock pistol
that was loaded with 20 rounds in a high-capacity magazine
and had been modified to fire in an automatic mode, another
high-capacity magazine loaded with 22 rounds, and three
regular magazines loaded with 13 rounds each. Pagan was
charged with illegal possession of a machine gun, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o); he only pled guilty to possession of a
firearm. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties
stipulated that the government would recommend a sentence at
the middle of the applicable guideline range but that
Pagán could request a sentence at the low end of the
range. Both parties and the Probation Department agreed that
Pagán's Total Offense Level ("TOL") was
17, with an applicable guideline range of 30 to 37 months. At
the sentencing hearing, the district court nevertheless
imposed a 60-month sentence, varying from the applicable
guidelines range. This appeal ensued.
Pagán's plea agreement contains an appeal waiver,
we agree with the parties that it is a dead letter when, as
here, the waiver was conditional upon sentencing within the
parties' recommendations. United States v.
Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 568-69 (1st Cir.
now challenges both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. In summary, he argues that:
the district court committed procedural errors by (1) failing
to provide a written statement of reasons; (2) failing to
take his history and characteristics into account; and (3)
giving undue weight to the need of general deterrence and
impermissibly speculating on his criminal motive. None of
them persuade us.
take it that Pagán timely objected to the alleged
procedural errors. For preserved procedural challenges, we
review for abuse of discretion.
Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d at 569. In doing so,
we also review the sentencing court's factfinding for
clear error. Id.
alleges that it was procedural error for the district court
not to provide a statement of reasons, though in this case
there was a statement of reasons provided by the district
court but Pagán was not aware of this because it was
not docketed. See United States v.
Millán-Isaac, 749 F.3d 57, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2014).
. We need not determine what effect, if any, the court's
failure to docket it would have because "remand is
necessary 'only if the sentence was imposed as a
result' of the error." United States v.
Vázquez-Martínez, 812 F.3d 18, 25 (1st
Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Tavares, 705
F.3d 4, 25 (1st Cir. 2013)). That is not the case here.
Furthermore, we do not see how the sentence imposed was
"a result" of the error given that the written form
contains identical reasons provided by the district court
judge during the sentencing hearing.
Vázquez-Martínez, 812 F.3d at 25
("Given our review of the district court's oral
explanation, we believe that the district court would have
imposed the same sentence had it filed a written statement of
reasons form."); see also United States v.
Pedroza-Orengo, 817 F.3d 829, 837 (1st Cir. 2016)
(finding the failure to submit a written statement of reasons
harmless because of "the district court's
comprehensive explanation of reasons in open court").
Therefore, we decline to remand for resentencing simply
because the district court failed to docket its written
statement of reasons.
also alleges that the district court failed to take his
personal history and characteristics into account and
neglected to consider § 3553(a) factors. United
States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52, 63 (1st Cir. 2009).
Pagan's argument muddies the line between challenges of
procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness. Per
Pagán, the district court neglected to consider §
3553(a) because it rejected these mitigating facts and
"overwhelmingly focused on the nature of the firearm and
ammunition found." However, this argument disproves his
theory because it would mean that the district court was
anything but neglectful of § 3553(a) factors. Rather,
the district court considered and rejected the mitigating
factors before turning to the nature of the offense.
also alleges that the district court judge rejected
mitigating facts for improper reasons, for example, by
discounting Pagán's back-breaking work in a tire
shop by stating that "even a woman can do this."
Though we are not condoning these inappropriate remarks, they
were made during a discussion about whether
Pagán's prior work experience was sufficient to
reduce his sentence. Pagán's argument was that the
work was proof that he was not involved in criminal activity.
The district court considered and rejected this argument.
Thus, we cannot find that the district court failed to
consider mitigating factors.
also argues that the district court relied unduly on the need
for general deterrence in Puerto Rico and impermissibly
speculated on his criminal intent in possessing the firearms.
However, the need for general deterrence is a permissible
factor to consider and the sentencing court does not abuse
its discretion if it is also attentive to case-specific
factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); United States v.
Bermúdez-Meléndez, 827 F.3d 160, 166 (1st
Cir. 2016) (permissible to consider violent crime rate in
Puerto Rico as the court remained attentive to the
particulars of the case). In fact, the sentencing judge
stressed numerous times the specific circumstances of this
case. Furthermore, the sentencing judge's reference to
Pagán's potential criminal motivation in
possessing the firearms was in response to Pagán's
assertion that with respect to his own criminal background
"firearms can be reasonably argued it is a vestige of
the past." The sentencing judge need not accept
Pagán's speculation about his benign motive, nor
can we say that the court's finding of potential criminal
motive is clearly erroneous. United States v.
García, 34 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) ("The
district court's finding of intent is a factual finding
which we review for clear error . . . . Where the undisputed
facts support more than one plausible inference, the
sentencing court's choice among supportable alternatives
cannot be clearly erroneous.").
his procedural challenges, Pagán also argues that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because nothing in the
record distinguishes this case from an ordinary one
contemplated by the sentencing guidelines and that the need
for general deterrence and the community conditions in Puerto
Rico alone cannot support an upward variance. For preserved
challenges to a sentence's substantive reasonableness, we
review for abuse of discretion.
Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d at 569. The standard
of review for unpreserved substantive challenges is
"murky, " United States v. Pérez,
819 F.3d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 2016), but we remain unpersuaded
even under the more lenient abuse-of-discretion standard.
sentencing judge did not think this case was an ordinary one
contemplated by the sentencing guidelines, and we find no
abuse of discretion in his conclusion. The sentencing judge
emphasized multiple times the specific facts of this case,
such as the chipped and loaded pistol that could fire like a
machine gun, the high-capacity magazines, and 72 rounds of
ammunition. The sentencing judge further commented that
Pagán's fire power was greater than all the
marshals in the courtroom combined and called
Pagán's collection a "mini-arsenal." It
is true that the sentencing judge gave less weight to
Pagán's mitigating factors than the need for
general deterrence and his likely intent to commit a more
severe crime, but the sentencing court gave reasoned
arguments for the sentence it imposed. It outlined the
rationale, its treatment of the mitigating factors, and even
engaged in a criminology debate with the defense counsel over
the effectiveness of incarceration. See United States v.
Fernández-Cabrera, 625 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir.
2010) ("While the court ordinarily should identify the
main factors upon which it relies, its statement need not be
lengthy . . . nor need it dissect every factor made relevant
by 18 U.S.C. § 3553. . . . Even silence is not
necessarily fatal; 'a court's reasoning can often be
inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or
contained in the presentence report with what the judge
did.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st
Cir. 2006))). At the end of the hearing the court briefly
referred to the § 3553(a) factors and asked whether the
defense counsel had anything further. Only upon being
satisfied that all relevant factors had been discussed did
the court impose the variant sentence. We have repeatedly
held that after the district court correctly calculates the
guidelines range, "sentencing becomes a judgment call,
" United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 73
(1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Martin,
520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008)), and "[t]here is no one
reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, a universe
of reasonable sentencing outcomes, " United States
v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing
Martin, 520 F.3d at 92). And while
Pagán's 60-month sentence is considerably longer
than the 37-month sentence recommended by parties, "no
extraordinary circumstances are required to justify a
sentence outside the Guidelines range."
Pedroza-Orengo, 817 F.3d at 837 (quoting United
States v. Nelson, 793 F.3d 202, 207 (1st Cir. 2015)).
Therefore, the sentence reflected a "plausible, albeit
not inevitable, view of the circumstances sufficient to
distinguish this case from the mine-run of cases covered by
the [guidelines range]." United States v. Del
Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171, 177 (1st Cir.
the district court did not commit procedural or substantive
error. Pagán's sentence is therefore