United States District Court, D. Maine
DAVID J. WIDI, JR., Plaintiff,
PAUL MCNEIL, et al., Defendants.
RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION ORDER
A. WOODCOCK, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Court directs entry of final judgment as to Plaintiff David
J. Widi's Right to Financial Privacy Act claims against
TD BankNorth (TD Bank) and the United States Attorney's
13, 2012, David J. Widi, Jr., acting pro se, filed a
complaint against numerous federal and state officials
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his
rights from his investigation, prosecution, and conviction
for possession of firearms and ammunition by a felon and for
manufacturing marijuana. Compl. (ECF No. 1);
United States v. Widi, 2:09-cr-00009-GZS (D. Me.).
In Count XI of the Complaint, Mr. Widi also claimed that TD
Bank violated the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), 12
U.S.C. § 3401 et seq., when the USAO subpoenaed Mr.
Widi's bank records for presentation to a federal grand
jury. Id. at 14. On August 2, 2012, Mr. Widi filed
an amended complaint. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15). As
with the original Complaint, Count XI of the First Amended
Complaint asserted an RFPA claim against TD Bank.
Id. at 15. On September 25, 2013, the Court granted
TD Bank's motion for summary judgment. Order Granting
Mot. for Summ. J. by Def. TD Bank; Den. Mot. to Strike; Den.
Disc.; and Dismissing Without Prejudice Mot. for Serv. of
Process (ECF No. 171) (TD Bank Summ. J. Order).
November 18, 2013, Mr. Widi filed a Second Amended Complaint.
Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 191). Mr. Widi's
Second Amended Complaint moved the RFPA count to Count XVII,
and it amended his claim to run not just against TD Bank, but
also against the USAO. Id. at 56-58. On February 11,
2015, the Court issued a screening order that prohibited Mr.
Widi from reviving his claim against TD Bank. Screening
Order, Order Vacating in Part Earlier Order Den. Mot. for
Leave to File Second Am. Compl. as to Served Defs., Order
Granting in Part Mot. to File Second Am. Compl., Order
Striking Portions of the Second Am. Compl., and Order Den.
Mot. to Stay at 29-30 (ECF No. 270) (Screening
an oversight, the Court did not address Mr. Widi's claim
against the USAO in its Screening Order. On May 4, 2015, Mr.
Widi filed a motion for reconsideration to alert the Court to
the oversight, Mot. for Recons. at 18-19 (ECF No.
292), and on January 10, 2017, the Court issued an order
permitting Mr. Widi to assert a claim against the USAO as set
forth in Count XVII of the Second Amended Complaint.
Order on Mot. for Recons. at 27-30 (ECF No. 392).
The Court granted the USAO's motion for summary judgment
on Count XVII on July 24, 2017. Order on Mot. for Summ.
J. on Count XVII. (ECF No. 467) (USAO Summ. J.
Order). The Court now directs entry of final judgment on
Mr. Widi's RFPA claims against both TD Bank and the USAO
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
54(b) provides in part:
When an action presents more than one claim for
relief-whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or
third-party claim-or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,
but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.
order the entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b), a court
must first “consider whether the entire case as a whole
and the particular disposition that has been made and for
which the entry of a judgment is sought fall within the scope
of the rule.” 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2655 (2014 ed.). The “general requirements are that the
case include either multiple claims, multiple parties, or
both and that either one or more but fewer than all the
claims have been finally decided or that all the rights and
liabilities of at least one party have been
adjudicated.” Id. Second, a court must
“expressly find that there is no just reason to delay
an appeal.” Id.
First Circuit has further illuminated the requirements for a
Rule 54(b) certification. To certify a judgment pursuant to
Rule 54(b), a district court must find (1) that the ruling is
final and (2) that there is no just reason for delay.
Nystedt v. Nigro, 700 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir.
2012). Finality “requires that a judgment
‘dispose of all the rights and liabilities of at least
one party as to at least one
claim.'” Lee- Barnes v.
Puerto Ven Quarry Corp., 513 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2008)
(quoting State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Brockrim,
Inc., 87 F.3d 1487, 1489 (1st Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in
Lee-Barnes); see also Maldonado-Denis v.
Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he ruling underlying the proposed judgment must
itself be final in the sense that it disposes completely
either of all claims against a given defendant or of some
discrete substantive claim or set of claims against the
defendants generally”) (citing Spiegel v. Trustees
of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1988)).
the court determines finality, it turns to whether there is
no just reason for delay by assessing “(1) any
interrelationship or overlap among the various legal and
factual issues involved in the dismissed and the pending
claims, and (2) any equities and efficiencies implicated by
the requested piecemeal review.” Credit Francais
Int'l, S.A. v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 706 (1st
Cir. 1996) (citing Kersey v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 3
F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1993)). Finally, if a district court
certifies a judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), “it should
not only make that explicit determination but should also
make specific findings and set forth its reasoning.”
Quinn v. City of Boston, 325 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.
2003) (citing Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 42-43).
Count XI of the First Amended Complaint, Mr. Widi alleged
that TD Bank violated the RFPA. Am. Compl. at 15.
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of TD Bank,
TD Bank Summ. J. Order, and issued an order
prohibiting Mr. Widi ...