LAURA A. MILLAY
JOHN E. MCKAY JR.
Submitted On Briefs: January 19, 2017
J. Harris, Esq., Paine, Lynch & Harris, PA, Bangor, for
appellant Laura A. Millay.
B. Bickerman, Esq., Lipman & Katz, PA, Augusta, for
appellee John E. McKay, Jr.
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
Laura A. Millay and John "Jack" E. McKay Jr. were
married on November 18, 2006, and have two young children. A
few days before the marriage, when Millay was pregnant with
their first child, McKay presented Millay with a prenuptial
agreement, which she signed without benefit of counsel.
McKay entered the marriage with substantial financial assets,
including revocable and irrevocable trusts worth over $1,
000, 000 and two properties located on Ohio Street in Bangor.
Before their marriage, the couple purchased, as joint
tenants, property on Verona Island. McKay spent over $400,
000 of his nonmarital assets to support the relationship and
the marriage, including the purchase of property on Verona
Island, contributions to Millay's education, and
renovations to the Ohio Street and Verona Island properties.
Despite the property improvements, all the properties'
values decreased significantly during the marriage due to
After six years of marriage, Millay and McKay separated in
April 2013. McKay then conveyed his interest in the Verona
Island property to Millay. She filed for divorce on September
13, 2013, in the District Court (Bangor) on the ground of
irreconcilable differences. See 19-A M.R.S.
After a two-day trial, by judgment dated January 21, 2016,
supported by extensive findings, the court (Jordan,
J.) set aside the parties' nonmarital property;
divided their joint assets and debts; ordered McKay to pay
Millay child support, retroactive to February 2015; declined
to award spousal support other than as part of property
division; denied Millay's request for attorney fees; and
incorporated into the judgment the parties' agreement
regarding parental rights and responsibilities.
In its judgment, the court recognized the existence of the
prenuptial agreement, noted the infirmities in its formation,
indicated that its decisions regarding property division and
spousal support were made based on the laws and general
principles courts apply in dividing marital property and
determining spousal support, and stated that "an
analysis independent of the prenuptial agreement renders the
issues as to its enforceability irrelevant." Addressing
allocation of the Verona Island property to Millay, the court
suggested that its award to Millay may have been less
favorable to her, but for provisions in the prenuptial
Millay filed several post-judgment motions pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 52(b), 59(a), (b), and (e); and 60(b)(6). She now
appeals from the court's property division, spousal
support, and attorney fee determinations, from some
evidentiary rulings, and from the denial of her post-judgment
motions. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2016); 19-A
M.R.S. §104 (2016), M.R. App. 2.
Millay's challenges focus on the division of marital
property and the denial of spousal support and attorney fees.
Regarding these issues, the court findings, supported by the
record, indicate that (1) McKay had contributed to the
marriage approximately $400, 000 of his nonmarital assets;
(2) he had made payments to support Millay completing her
college education during the marriage; (3) Millay left the
marriage with a valuable asset, the Verona Island real
estate, which she did not have prior to the marriage; and (4)
the parties had similar incomes or earning capacity.
When a party to a domestic relations appeal "asserts
that the trial court's findings are not supported by
evidence in the record, we review the record, and reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the record, in the light
most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine
if the findings are supportable by competent evidence."
Sloan v. Chhstianson,2012 ME 72, ¶ 2, 43 A.3d
978. See also Buck v. Buck,2015 ME 33, ¶ 5,