United States District Court, D. Maine
ORDER ON THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
LEVY U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
action, the Plaintiff, Dairyland Insurance Company
(“Dairyland”) seeks to rescind certain automobile
insurance policies that it issued to the Defendant, McArthur
Sullivan, alleging that Sullivan made material fraudulent
representations in his application for insurance. Dairyland
also seeks a declaration stating that it is relieved of any
obligation to provide insurance coverage, including defense
matter is before the court on Dairyland's Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76). Sullivan did not file an
opposition to the motion or respond to Dairyland's
Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 77). For the reasons
explained below, Dairyland's motion is granted.
Rule 56 directs that “[f]acts contained in a supporting
or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by
record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed
admitted unless properly controverted.” Loc. R. 56(f).
Because Sullivan did not file a response to Dairyland's
Statement of Material Facts or otherwise controvert the facts
contained in it, those facts are deemed admitted.
Accordingly, I incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through
40 of Dairyland's Statement of Material Facts.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490,
495 (1st Cir. 2014). “A dispute is genuine if
‘the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable
jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving
party.'” Johnson v. Univ. of P.R., 714
F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Thompson v.
Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008)).
“A fact is material if it has potential to determine
the outcome of the litigation.” Id. (citing
Maymí v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25
(1st Cir. 2008)).
determining whether a party moving for summary judgment has
met its burden, the court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the
benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Brooks
v. AIG SunAmerica Life Assur. Co., 480 F.3d 579, 586
(1st Cir. 2007). Once the moving party has made a preliminary
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the
nonmovant must “produce specific facts, in suitable
evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy
issue.” Id. (citing Clifford v.
Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
“[A]s to any essential factual element of its claim on
which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial,
its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to
generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the
moving party.” In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31
(1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Local Rule 56
evidence that the court may consider in deciding whether
genuine issues of material fact exist for purposes of summary
judgment is circumscribed by the local rules of this
district. See Loc. R. 56. The moving party must
first file a statement of material facts that it claims are
not in dispute. See Loc. R. 56(b). Each fact must be
set forth in a numbered paragraph and supported by a specific
record citation. See Id. The court may disregard
“any statement of fact not supported by a specific
citation to record material properly considered on summary
judgment” and has “no independent duty to search
or consider any part of the record not specifically
referenced in the parties' separate statement of
facts.” Loc. R. 56(f); see also, e.g., Packgen v.
BP Exploration, Inc., 754 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule
56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for
purposes of the motion[.]”).
Count One: Rescission of the Policies Under 24 M.R.S.A.
2411 of the Maine Insurance Code, 24-A M.R.S.A. §§
1-7305 (2017), governs statements made in an application for
insurance and provides that an insurer may deny recovery if
it has proof of a misrepresentation, omission, or concealment
that was both fraudulent and material to the acceptance of
the risk. N. E. Ins. Co. v. Young,2011 ME 89,
¶ 18, 26 A.3d 794; see also Liberty Ins.
Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner,2008 ME 149,
¶ 14, 957 A.2d 94 (“Title 24-A M.R.S. § 2411
requires an insurer to prove both fraud and ...