United States District Court, D. Maine
DAVID J. WIDI, JR., Plaintiff,
PAUL MCNEIL, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ CLARK AND
LYON’S MOTION FOR FINAL JUDGMENT
A. WOODCOCK, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
no genuine dispute of material fact as to the legality of a
search of David Widi’s home in November 2005, the Court
granted summary judgment on Count XIII to Probation Officers
Denis Clark and Michael Lyon. Probation Officers Clark and
Lyon now move for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule
54(b). The summary judgment order has the requisite finality
as to the movants, but Count XIII remains pending as to a
third Defendant: Detective Kevin Curran. Given (1) the
substantial overlap between the pending claims against
Detective Curran and the dismissed claims against Probation
Officers Clark and Lyon and (2) the movants’ failure to
convince the Court of their exigent need for final judgment,
the Court denies the request to enter final judgment as to
Defendants Clark and Lyon on Count XIII.
September 24, 2013, the Court dismissed without prejudice
Defendants Denis Clark and Michael Lyon’s (the
Defendants’) first motion for summary judgment based on
the limitations period for actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Order Denying Mot. for Summ. J. by Defs. Clark and
Lyon (ECF No. 169). On April 21, 2014, the Court granted
the Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment.
Order Granting Mot. for Summ. J. by Defs. Clark
and Lyon (ECF No. 236) (Summ. J. Order). On May
12, 2014, David Widi filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s order granting summary judgment to the
Defendants. Mot. for Recons. of Order Granting Summ. J.
to Defs. Clark and Lyon (ECF No. 242). On July 25, 2014,
and August 14, 2014, Mr. Widi filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration and a second supplemental motion for
reconsideration, respectively. Suppl. Mot. for Recons.
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(b) with Accompanying Req. for
Disc. Order (ECF No. 246); Second Suppl. Mot. for
Recons. under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(b) (ECF No.
248). The Court denied all three motions on October 7, 2014.
Order Denying Pl.’s Mots. for Recons. (ECF No.
257) (Recons. Order).
December 9, 2015, Defendants Clark and Lyon moved for entry
of final judgment. Mot. for Entry of Final J. (ECF
No. 326) (Defs.’ Mot.). Mr. Widi filed a
response on December 21, 2015, Obj. to Mot. for Entry of
Final J. (ECF No. 332) (Pl.’s Resp.), and
the Defendants filed a reply on December 30, 2015. Reply
to Opp’n to Mot. for Entry of Final J. (ECF No.
333) (Defs.’ Reply).
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Defendants move
for entry of final judgment as to the claims against them.
Defs.’ Mot. at 1 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)).
According to the Defendants, “the court must carefully
compare the dismissed and unadjudicated claims for
indications of substantial legal or factual overlap to ensure
that an appellate court is not confronted with successive
appeals with common issues of law and fact.”
Id. (citing Kersey v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 3
F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1993)). While Mr. Widi brought claims
related to his arrest and the search and seizure of his
property in November 2008, the Defendants explain that Mr.
Widi’s claims against Probation Officers Clark and Lyon
related to an allegedly illegal entry into his apartment in
November 2005-i.e., “three years before his
arrest and subsequent prosecution in 2008” and
“completely unrelated to the 2008 arrest and
prosecution from which all of his other claims arise.”
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the
Defendants argue there is “no danger that the results
of an adjudication of the remaining claims without the
involvement of Clark and Lyon would possibly present an
appellate court with successive appeals having common issues
of law and fact” as the claim against them is
“temporally, factually, and legally distinct . . .
David J. Widi, Jr.’s Response
Widi objects on the ground that although the Court granted
summary judgment with regard to Probation Officers Clark and
Lyon, “the claim relating to them remains pending
against Defendant Curr[a]n and, therefore, is an issue of
successive appeals with common issues of law and fact.”
Pl.’s Resp. at 1. Although the Court has
rejected Mr. Widi’s contention that the Probation
Officers required reasonable suspicion to enter his home in
November 2005, “Mr. Widi has the opportunity to argue
against Defendant Curr[a]n that the Consent to Random Drug or
Alcohol Testing and to Searches Based on Reasonable Suspicion
was the controlling condition” and “this Court
may conclude on second-thought that the claim against
Defendant[s] Clark and Lyon should be restored under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) at that time.” Id. at 2.
Defendants emphasize that the Court has already determined as
a matter of law, and confirmed its ruling upon
reconsideration, that the Probation Officers’ entry
into Mr. Widi’s home in November 2005 was lawful under
the operative probation conditions. Defs.’
Reply at 1. Thus, they conclude, “[i]t appears
unlikely that the court might decide to restore the claims
against Clark and Lyon if and when it hears from defendant
Curran on this issue.” Id.