APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S.
Levchuk, with whom Bulkley, Richardson & Gelinas was on
brief, for appellant.
Grant, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Carmen M.
Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
Barron, Circuit Judge, Souter,[*] Associate Justice, And
Selya, Circuit Judge.
case concerns a defendant's appeal of his convictions and
sentence for participating in a complex, multi-million dollar
investment fraud. Finding no error, we affirm in all
appellant is Evripides Georgiadis, a Greek national. On June
16, 2011, he was named in an indictment by a federal grand
jury in Massachusetts.
indictment charged Georgiadis and three others -- John Condo,
Michael Zanetti, and Frank Barecich -- with creating a
fictional private equity fund, known variously as " BBDA
Global Investment Fund" or " DAC Global," and
making false promises about that fund to defraud unwitting
developers into making deposits totaling nearly $8 million
into bank accounts controlled by the defendants from February
2008 through August 2010. The indictment set forth fourteen
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343
and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371. A superseding indictment, dated
September 22, 2011, added a sixteenth count for conspiracy to
commit money laundering.
following May, Croatian law enforcement authorities arrested
Georgiadis at a border crossing in Croatia. In June of that
year, the United States sought his extradition for trial on
the charges set forth in the superseding indictment, and in
December of that year Croatia's Ministry of Justice
authorized his extradition.
to trial, Georgiadis moved for dismissal of the conspiracy to
commit money laundering count on the ground that his
extradition did not authorize his trial on that count. The
District Court denied the motion.
the course of March and April of 2014, Georgiadis's three
co-defendants entered guilty pleas. Georgiadis did not. His
trial began on April 22, 2014.
close of the government's case, three of the wire fraud
counts were dismissed on the government's motion. As a
result, only thirteen total counts -- including the
conspiracy to commit money laundering count -- went to the
14, 2014, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all thirteen
counts. The District Court then sentenced Georgiadis to 102
months of imprisonment.
raises a number of challenges here. Some relate only to his
conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. Others
relate to each of his convictions. He also challenges his
sentence. We consider his arguments in this order, and we
reject each of them.
makes two separate challenges to his conviction on Count 16,
which charged him with conspiracy to commit money
laundering. The first challenge concerns his
extradition. The second challenge concerns venue.
extradition-based challenge implicates the " principle
of specialty," or, as it is also known, the "
doctrine of specialty." United States v. Tse,
135 F.3d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v.
Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir. 1995). That
doctrine " generally requires that an extradited
defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has
been granted, and none other." Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at
766. " Because the doctrine of
specialty is concerned with comity rather than the rights of
the defendant, . . . [it] exists only to the extent that the
surrendering country wishes." Tse, 135 F.3d at 205. For
that reason, " [i]n general, we do not believe that
there can be a violation of the principle of specialty where
the requesting nation prosecutes the returned fugitive for
the exact crimes on which the surrendering nation granted
extradition." Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 768.
the decision of the Croatian Ministry of Justice (the "
Decision" ) clearly authorized Georgiadis's
extradition on all counts charged in the indictment,
including Count 16. [Dkt. No. 157, Ex. 1, 1]. Indeed, the
Decision specifically states that Georgiadis " can be
extradited . . . based on the probable cause that he has
committed . . . one criminal act of conspiracy to commit
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956
Georgiadis contends that Croatia did not actually intend to
extradite Georgiadis on Count 16. To support this surprising
contention, he points to the statement in the Decision that
expressly purports to extradite Georgiadis " [p]ursuant
to the provisions of" a 1902 treaty between the United
States and what was then Servia (" 1902 Treaty"
). Georgiadis argues that the Decision
nowhere states that conspiracy to commit money laundering is
an offense covered by that 1902 Treaty. And Georgiadis
further contends that the 1902 Treaty does not, in fact,
cover that offense. Georgiadis also appears to argue that the
Decision misidentified Count 16 as a reference to a "
computer fraud" crime. Thus, Georgiadis concludes, the
Decision is best read to authorize Georgiadis's
extradition for only those crimes that are covered by the
1902 Treaty or, " [a]t best," to " reflect
confusion" about the substance of Count 16.
Georgiadis's contention that Croatia did not actually
authorize his extradition for Count 16 is not one that
Croatia itself advances. Nor is it one that can be reconciled
with the plain language of the Decision that Croatia issued
to authorize Georgiadis's extradition. The references in
the translated Decision to " computer fraud" seem
clearly to track the wire fraud counts against Georgiadis,
and the " justification" section of the Decision
separately refers to " money laundering" on
multiple occasions. Thus, the Decision does not reveal the
confusion that Georgiadis claims it reflects, and it simply
cannot be read to limit Georgiadis's extradition such
that it does not cover Count 16.
does also appear to argue that even if Croatia intended to
extradite him on Count 16, the 1902 Treaty barred Croatia
from doing so because the treaty does not cover the crime of
conspiracy to commit money laundering. He relies on
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct.
234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886), which states at one point that a
defendant extradited pursuant to a treaty can " only be
tried for one of the offenses described in that treaty."
Id. at 430.
have previously made clear that Rauscher applies to "
situations where an American court tries the fugitive for a
crime other than the one for which extradition was
granted." Autry v. Wiley, 440 F.2d 799, 801
(1st Cir. 1971); see Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424 (explaining
that an extradited defendant has a right to " be tried
only for the offense with which he is charged in the
extradition proceedings, and for which he was delivered
up" ). And, as we have explained, Croatia made clear in
its Decision that it extradited Georgiadis for trial on the
conspiracy to commit money laundering count for which he was
extent Georgiadis argues that we may independently determine
that Croatia lacked the authority to effect the extradition
that Croatia plainly authorized in its Decision "
[p]ursuant to the provisions of the [1902 Treaty]," we
rejected an equivalent argument in Autry. In doing so, we
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ker v.
Illinois,119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421
(1886). We explained in Autry that the Court in Ker held
that, subject to limited exceptions not applicable here,
" neither the method by which an accused is brought
before a criminal court, nor the legality of his forcible
seizure or arrest . . . nor his subsequent forcible and
illegal transportation and confinement are material to the
question of the jurisdiction of a criminal court before whom
he is present." Autry, 440 F.2d at 801. Thus, this
aspect of Georgiadis's extradition-based challenge also
cannot succeed. Id. (explaining that the defendant
could not challenge his conviction on the ground that the
treaty did not authorize ...