ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
E. WALKER, JUSTICE
matter comes before the court on Defendant Brian Ingalls'
motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the
reasons stated herein, Defendant's motion to dismiss is
State brings this action against Mr. Ingalls pursuant to the
Maine Civil Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 4681 and 4684-B
(2)(D) (hereafter the "Act"). The State alleges
that on or about October 23, 2015, Mr. Ingalls yelled toward
the second floor of the building located at 443 Congress
Street in Portland, in which Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England operates a health care facility. The State avers
that Mr. Ingalls' yelled with the intent and did in fact
cause the disruption of the safe and effective delivery of
health services inside the facility in violation of the Act.
The State requests that the court grant relief as follows:
(1) enjoin Mr. Ingalls from knowingly coming within 50 feet
of Planned Parenthood's facilities; (2) enjoin Mr.
Ingalls from further violating section 4684(2)(D); (3)
declare that Mr. Ingalls violated the Maine Civil Rights Act;
(4) order Mr. Ingalls to pay a civil penalty of up to $5, 000
for each violation; and (5) order Mr. Ingalls to pay the
State's reasonable attorney's fees.
Standard of Review
motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint and will be granted only if the complaint fails
"to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); State v.
Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28, ¶ 10, 868 A.2d 200. The
sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. Bean v.
Cummings, 2008 ME 18, ¶ 7, 939 A.2d 676. On a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the facts are
not adjudicated. Marshall v. Town of Dexter, 2015 ME
135, ¶ 2, 125 A.3d 1141. The court reviews the material
allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff to determine whether the plaintiff would be
entitled to relief pursuant to some legal theory.
Bean, 2008 ME 18, ¶ 7, 939 A.2d 676. Dismissal
is warranted only when it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts
that the plaintiff might prove in support of his or her
motion to dismiss is bottomed on three main arguments; to
1. The State has failed to make allegations that would
support a claim under the Maine Civil Rights Act;
2. The relief sought by the State would constitute an
impermissible restriction on Mr. Ingalls's speech rights
that are afforded to him by the First Amendment; and
3. The salient provision of the Maine Civil Rights Act is
unconstitutionally vague on its face.
The Complaint sets forth allegations for which relief may
be granted under 5 M.R.S. §§ 4681 and 4684-B.
Maine Civil Rights Act empowers the Attorney General to bring
an injunction action against a person who violates section
4684-B, entitled "Additional Protections." The
relevant section of the "Additional Protections"
section of the Act that the State presses, provides as
2. Violation. It is a violation of this section for any
person, whether or not acting under color of law, to
intentionally interfere or attempt to intentionally interfere
with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights
secured by the Untied States Constitution or the laws of the
United States or of rights secured ...