United States District Court, D. Maine
ORDER ON ALL PENDING MOTIONS
GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.
1. Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Before the Court are Plaintiff Alla Iosifovna Shuper's Applications to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 4, 11 & 15). The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action.
2. Motions For Reconsideration
Also before the Court are the Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 3) and the Motion to Amend the Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 5). Both of these Motions pertain to the Court's November 18, 2014 Order requesting that Plaintiff either pay the filing fee or file a request to proceed in forma pauperis in each of her docketed cases. (See Order (ECF No. 2).) In light of the Court's decision to grant Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds the requests for reconsideration (ECF Nos. 3 & 5) MOOT. The Court notes that similar motions for reconsideration were filed in each of Plaintiff's then twenty-four cases.
3. Appeal To The Chief Judge
Plaintiff Shuper has also filed an Appeal to the Chief Judge (ECF No. 6). To the extent that Plaintiff Shuper is appealing the Court's November 18, 2014 Order to the Chief Judge, there is no such right to appeal to the Chief Judge, and it is therefore DENIED. As with the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to Amend the Motion for Reconsideration, pro se Plaintiff Shuper's Appeal to the Chief Judge was filed in each of her then twenty-four cases.
4. Change In Pro Se Filing Status
Plaintiff Shuper has also filed a Motion to Accept the Change in Pro Se Filing, thereby requesting that she be permitted to file documents manually rather than electronically (ECF No. 8). The Court GRANTS the Motion, which has also been filed in each of her cases.
5. Review Of The Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
Upon the Court's review of the Complaint, the Court concludes that the case must be dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Through the handwritten Complaint, Plaintiff Shuper attempts to bring a case against Disability Reinsurance Management Services. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Shuper worked at Disability Reinsurance Management Services from January of 2005 until June of 2007. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 1.) In the beginning, Plaintiff Shuper worked as a copy clerk, and she later worked in a different position. ( Id. ¶¶2, 3.) The Complaint alleges that after Plaintiff Shuper became sick in 2006, the Supervisor began asking Plaintiff Shuper questions about her disability. ( Id. ¶ 5.) Although Plaintiff Shuper did not tell the Supervisor about her disability, the Complaint alleges that the Supervisor began discriminating against Plaintiff Shuper by creating complaints in Plaintiff Shuper's group. (Id.) The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff Shuper was fired, and that another individual, the Manager of the Facility Department, was fired as well. ( Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff Shuper worked hours that were not accounted for or calculated. ( Id. ¶ 11.) For relief, the Complaint requests an investigation into the actions of Disability Resource Management Services and $100, 000. The Complaint does not indicate under what legal theory or statute Plaintiff is pursuing her claim.
Liberally construing the Complaint, the Court cannot see any claim against the named Defendant. First, to the extent that Plaintiff Shuper asserts a claim for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in order to be held liable under § 1983, a defendant must be a state actor. Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan Capestrano , 412 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that "a plaintiff claiming a § 1983 violation must allege that a person or persons acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right.... If the plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish... that the defendant or defendants acted under color of state law, then the § 1983 claim is subject to dismissal. (internal citations omitted).) Plaintiff Shuper does not allege that the Defendant is a state actor nor do the facts support such a finding. See id. at 4-9 (finding that a private hospital, private healthcare services provider and private physicians were not state actors and could not be held liable under section 1983). Therefore, the Complaint does not state a claim under § 1983.
The Complaint also fails to state a claim for a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of a disability and states:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, ...