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Shuper v. Staples Corp.

United States District Court, D. Maine

December 12, 2014

ALLA IOSIFOVNA SHUPER, Plaintiff,
v.
STAPLES CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

ORDER ON ALL PENDING MOTIONS

GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.

1. Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Before the Court are Plaintiff Alla Iosifovna Shuper's Applications to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 4, 11 & 15). The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action.

2. Motions For Reconsideration

Also before the Court are the Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 3) and the Motion to Amend the Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 5). Both of these Motions pertain to the Court's November 18, 2014 Order requesting that Plaintiff either pay the filing fee or file a request to proceed in forma pauperis in each of her docketed cases. (See Order (ECF No. 2).) In light of the Court's decision to grant Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds the requests for reconsideration (ECF Nos. 3 & 5) MOOT.[1] The Court notes that similar motions for reconsideration were filed in each of Plaintiff's then twenty-four cases.[2]

3. Appeal To The Chief Judge

Plaintiff Shuper has also filed an Appeal to the Chief Judge (ECF No. 6). To the extent that Plaintiff Shuper is appealing the Court's November 18, 2014 Order to the Chief Judge, there is no such right to appeal to the Chief Judge, and it is therefore DENIED. As with the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to Amend the Motion for Reconsideration, pro se Plaintiff Shuper's Appeal to the Chief Judge was filed in each of her then twenty-four cases.

4. Change In Pro Se Filing Status

Plaintiff Shuper has also filed a Motion to Accept the Change in Pro Se Filing, thereby requesting that she be permitted to file documents manually rather than electronically (ECF No. 8). The Court GRANTS the Motion, which has also been filed in each of her cases.

5. Review Of The Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Upon the Court's review of the Complaint, the Court concludes that the case must be dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Through the handwritten Complaint, Plaintiff Shuper attempts to bring a case against Staples Corporation, the Manager of the Staples in 2012 and the Copy Center Manager, Jean. The Complaint alleges that in the spring of 2012, Plaintiff Shuper visited a Staples store and the Supervisor, Jean, was not polite to her. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 1.) The Complaint alleges that the Supervisor, Jean: (1) asked Plaintiff Shuper to staple a pile of documents printed from her flash drive because the Supervisor wanted to help someone else (id. ¶ 1); (2) when Plaintiff Shuper asked for help, the Supervisor said, "do this yourself please" (id. ¶ 2); (3) when Plaintiff Shuper again asked for help, the Supervisor turned to her computer, refused to help Plaintiff Shuper and quoted a shipping price of $40.00 whereas the Manager quoted Plaintiff Shuper a price of $10.00 (id. ¶¶ 3, 4). The next time Plaintiff Shuper visited the store, a different manager gave Plaintiff Shuper's flash drive to an employee to print its contents but then later took the flash drive from the USB port. (Id. ¶¶5, 6.) At another time, a manager or employee took Plaintiff Shuper's book from a different employee, which he then stapled. (Id. ¶ 7.) Finally, the Complaint alleges that a different manager called the police when Plaintiff Shuper asked about store policies and that she was surprised that the title of "manager" changed from employee to employee. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Complaint alleges that the foregoing course of conduct violated the United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Maine Human Rights Act and requests $100, 000 in damages. (Id. at Relief.)

Liberally construing the Complaint, the Court cannot see any claim against the named Defendants. First, to the extent that Plaintiff Shuper asserts a claim for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in order to be held liable under § 1983, a defendant must be a state actor. Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan Capestrano, 412 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that "a plaintiff claiming a § 1983 violation must allege that a person or persons acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right.... If the plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish... that the defendant or defendants acted under color of state law, then the § 1983 claim is subject to dismissal.") Plaintiff Shuper does not allege that any of the Defendants, Staples Corporation, the Manager in 2012 or the Copy Center Supervisor, are state actors nor do the facts support such a finding. See id. at 4-9 (finding that a private hospital, private healthcare services provider and private physicians were not state actors and could not be held liable under section 1983). Therefore, the Complaint does not state a claim under § 1983.

The Complaint also fails to state a claim for a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Title III[3] of the ADA applies to places of "public accommodation" and provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To state a claim under this provision, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation; and, (3) the defendant discriminated against her by denying her a full and equal opportunity to enjoy the services the defendant provides on the basis of her disability. See Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008); Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff Shuper is disabled. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 176 F.Supp.2d 3, 7 (D. Me. 2001) aff'd on other grounds, 306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002) ("As an initial step in making out any ADA claim, the Plaintiff must establish that [s]he is a person with a disability.'").

Even assuming that Plaintiff Shuper is disabled and that Staples Corporation is a place of public accommodation, [4] the Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. There is no allegation or inference that Staples denied Plaintiff physical access, refused to sell her any goods or impaired her full enjoyment of the services and goods offered by Staples because of her disability. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1999) opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 204 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "an entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by the statute to provide disabled persons with physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by reason of discrimination against their disability."). Although Plaintiff Shuper's interactions with Staples and its staff appear unpleasant, "[u]nfortunately, legislation such as the ADA cannot regulate individuals' conduct so as ...


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